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Résumé
Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en macroéconomie et ﬁnances
publiques. Elle développe des modèles d’Equilibre Général Dynamique et
Stochastique pour analyser les implications macroéconomiques des politiques
d’imposition des entreprises en présence de marchés ﬁnanciers imparfaits.
Le premier chapitre analyse les mécanismes de transmission à l’économie, des
eﬀets d’un ré-échelonnement de l’impôt sur le proﬁt des entreprises. Dans une
économie constituée d’un gouvernement, d’une ﬁrme représentative et d’un
ménage représentatif, j’élabore un théorème de l’équivalence ricardienne avec
l’impôt sur le proﬁt des entreprises. Plus particulièrement, j’établis que si
les marchés ﬁnanciers sont parfaits, un ré-échelonnement de l’impôt sur le
proﬁt des entreprises qui ne change pas la valeur présente de l’impôt total
auquel l’entreprise est assujettie sur toute sa durée de vie n’a aucun eﬀet
réel sur l’économie si l’état utilise un impôt forfaitaire. Ensuite, en présence
de marchés ﬁnanciers imparfaits, je montre qu’une une baisse temporaire de
l’impôt forfaitaire sur le proﬁt des entreprises stimule l’investissement parce
qu’il réduit temporairement le coût marginal de l’investissement. Enﬁn, mes
résultats indiquent que si l’impôt est proportionnel au proﬁt des entreprises,
l’anticipation de taxes élevées dans le futur réduit le rendement espéré de
l’investissement et atténue la stimulation de l’investissement engendrée par
la réduction d’impôt.
Le deuxième chapitre est écrit en collaboration avec Rui Castro. Dans cet
article, nous avons quantiﬁé les eﬀets sur les décisions individuelles d’investis-
sement et de production des entreprises ainsi que sur les agrégats macroé-
conomiques, d’une baisse temporaire de l’impôt sur le proﬁt des entreprises
en présence de marchés ﬁnanciers imparfaits. Dans un modèle où les en-
treprises sont sujettes à des chocs de productivité idiosyncratiques, nous
avons d’abord établi que le rationnement de crédit aﬀecte plus les petites (je-
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unes) entreprises que les grandes entreprises. Pour des entreprises de même
taille, les entreprises les plus productives sont celles qui souﬀrent le plus du
manque de liquidité résultant des imperfections du marché ﬁnancier. En-
suite, nous montré que pour une baisse de 1 dollar du revenu de l’impôt,
l’investissement et la production augmentent respectivement de 26 et 3,5
centimes. L’eﬀet cumulatif indique une augmentation de l’investissement et
de la production agrégés respectivement de 4,6 et 7,2 centimes. Au niveau in-
dividuel, nos résultats indiquent que la politique stimule l’investissement des
petites entreprises, initialement en manque de liquidité, alors qu’elle réduit
l’investissement des grandes entreprises, initialement non contraintes.
Le troisième chapitre est consacré à l’analyse des eﬀets de la réforme de
l’imposition des revenus d’entreprise proposée par le Trésor américain en
1992. La proposition de réforme recommande l’élimination des impôts sur les
dividendes et les gains en capital et l’imposition d’une seule taxe sur le revenu
des entreprises. Pour ce faire, j’ai eu recours à un modèle dynamique stochas-
tique d’équilibre général avec marchés ﬁnanciers imparfaits dans lequel les en-
treprises sont sujettes à des chocs idiosyncratiques de productivité. Les résul-
tats indiquent que l’abolition des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en cap-
ital réduisent les distorsions dans les choix d’investissement des entreprises,
stimule l’investissement et entraîne une meilleure allocation du capital. Mais
pour être ﬁnancièrement soutenable, la réforme nécessite un relèvement du
taux de l’impôt sur le proﬁt des entreprises de 34% à 42%. Cette hausse
du taux d’imposition décourage l’accumulation du capital. En somme, la
réforme engendre une baisse de l’accumulation du capital et de la production
respectivement de 8% et 1%. Néanmoins, elle améliore l’allocation du capi-
tal de 20%, engendrant des gains de productivité de 1.41% et une modeste
augmentation du bien être des consommateurs.
Mots-clés: Hétérogénéité des entreprises, Marchés ﬁnanciers imparfaits,
Taxation des entreprises, Réforme ﬁscale, Régime de ﬁnancement, Modèle
d’équilibre général dynamique et stochastique, Investissement, Equivalence
ricardienne, Dynamiques de transition, Multiplicateur ﬁscal.
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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three papers in macroeconomics and public ﬁ-
nance. It develops Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models with a
special focus on ﬁnancial frictions to analyze the eﬀects of changes in corpo-
rate tax policy on ﬁrm level and macroeconomic aggregates.
Chapter 1 develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with a representa-
tive ﬁrm to assess the short-run eﬀects of changes in the timing of corporate
proﬁt taxes. First, it extends the Ricardian equivalence result to an envi-
ronment with production and establishes that a temporary corporate proﬁt
tax cut ﬁnanced by future tax-increase has no real eﬀect when the tax is
lump sum and capital markets are perfect. Second, I assess how strong the
ricardian forces are in the presence of ﬁnancing frictions. I ﬁnd that when
equity issuance is costly, and when the ﬁrm faces a lower bound on divi-
dend payments, a temporary tax cut reduces temporary the marginal cost of
investment and implies positive marginal propensity of investment. Third,
I analyze how do the intertemporal substitution eﬀects of tax cuts interact
with the stimulative eﬀects when tax is not lump-sum. The results show that
when tax is proportional to corporate proﬁt, the expectations of high future
tax rates reduce the expected marginal return on investment and mitigate
the stimulative eﬀects of tax cuts. The net investment response depends on
the relative strength of each eﬀect.
Chapter 2 is co-authored with Rui Castro. In this paper, we quantify how
eﬀective temporary corporate tax cuts are in stimulating investment and out-
put via relaxation of ﬁnancing frictions. In fact, policymakers often rely on
temporary corporate tax cuts in order to provide incentives for business in-
vestment in recession times. A common motivation is that such policies help
relax ﬁnancing frictions, which might bind more during recessions. We assess
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whether this mechanism is eﬀective. In an industry equilibrium model where
some ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained, marginal propensities to invest are
high. We consider a transitory corporate tax cut, funded by public debt. By
increasing current cash ﬂows, corporate tax cuts are eﬀective at stimulating
current investment. On impact, aggregate investment increases by 26 cents
per dollar of tax stimulus, and aggregate output by 3.5 cents. The stimu-
lative output eﬀects are long-lived, extending past the period the policy is
reversed, leading to a cumulative eﬀect multiplier on output of 7.2 cents. A
major factor preventing larger eﬀects is that this policy tends to signiﬁcantly
crowd out investment among the larger, unconstrained ﬁrms.
Chapter 3 studies the eﬀects of the 1992’s U.S. Treasury Department proposal
of a Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) reform. According to the
U.S. tax code, dividend and capital gain are taxed at the ﬁrm level and further
taxed when distributed to shareholders. This double taxation may reduce
the overall return on investment and induce ineﬃcient capital allocation.
Therefore, tax reforms have been at the center of numerous debates among
economists and policymakers. As part of this debate, the U.S. Department
of Treasury proposed in 1992 to abolish dividend and capital gain taxes,
and to use a Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) to levy tax on
corporate income. In this paper, I use an industry equilibrium model where
ﬁrms are subject to ﬁnancing frictions, and idiosyncratic productivity and
entry/exit shocks to assess the long run eﬀects of the CBIT. I ﬁnd that the
elimination of the capital gain and dividend taxes is not self ﬁnancing. More
precisely, the corporate proﬁt tax rate should be increased from 34% to 42%
to keep the reform revenue-neutral. Overall, the results show that the CBIT
reform reduces capital accumulation and output by 8% and 1%, respectively.
However, it improves capital allocation by 20%, resulting in an increase in
aggregate productivity by 1.41% and in a modest welfare gain.
Keywords : Firm heterogeneity, Financing frictions, Corporate Tax Policy,
Corporate tax reform, Finance regime, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium, Investment Dynamics, Ricardian equivalence, Transitional Dynamics,
Tax Cut Multipliers.
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Chapter 1
Are Government Bonds Net
Wealth? Ricardian Equivalence
with Corporate Taxation
21.1 Introduction
Corporate tax policy is a common instrument of government intervention in
the economy. Policymakers often rely on temporary corporate tax cuts to
stimulate or to stabilize the economy. For example, the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 temporary reduces the dividend and
capital gains taxes through 2008 to promote growth in the U.S.. During
the 2008 crisis, policymakers in almost all developed economies provide tem-
porary tax incentives to households and businesses to avert recession. 1 In
macroeconomic literature, there are conditions under which these stabiliza-
tion policies may not have any real eﬀects. More precisely, the Ricardian
equivalence theorem, revisited by Barro [1974], predicts an equivalence in
terms of prices and allocations between any two time paths of lump-sum
taxes used to ﬁnance a given pattern of government spending. This theory
has been extensively analyzed on the consumer side and related theoretical
and empirical studies focus on personal income taxes.
The goal of this paper is to assess how aggregate investment and output re-
spond to temporary corporate proﬁt tax cuts ﬁnanced by future increases.
First, it extends the Ricardian equivalence result to an environment with
production. For instance, it establishes that temporary reductions in cor-
porate proﬁt taxes have no real eﬀects if the tax is lump-sum, the present
value of tax burden is unchanged, and capital markets are perfect. Second,
I ﬁnd that when external ﬁnancing is costly, a temporary corporate tax cut
temporarily reduces the marginal cost of investment and implies a positive
marginal propensity to invest. Third, I show that when the tax is propor-
tional to corporate proﬁt, the expectations of higher future tax rates reduce
the expected marginal return on investment and counteract the direct eﬀects
of the tax incentives. The sign as well as the size of the net response of
investment or output depend on the relative strength of each eﬀect.
I focus on a simple general equilibrium model which integrates a represen-
tative household, a government and a representative ﬁrm. The ﬁrm owns
capital and is subject to a minimum dividend distribution policy. Accord-
ingly, its optimal investment may require some external fundings in addition
to internal cash ﬂows. But, I assume that equity issuance is costly. In
1. Without being exhaustive, I can cite the US 2010 Job Creation act which provides
ﬁrst year full depreciation for qualiﬁed investment made between September and december
2011, and the corporate tax provisions of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act.
3the absence of the lower bound on dividend payment and the cost of exter-
nal ﬁnancing, my setup satisﬁes a Ricardian proposition if tax is lump-sum.
Therefore, the eﬀects of temporary tax cuts on investment and output in this
paper heavily depend on the extent of ﬁnancial frictions and the nature of
the tax instrument.
This paper draws on the macroeconomic literature that analyzes the eﬀects
of temporary corporate tax cuts. Abel [1982], Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987],
and Auerbach and Hines [1987] study the eﬀects of corporate tax changes,
but they do not provide a general equilibrium analysis. In a general equilib-
rium model, Gourio and Miao [2011] quantify the eﬀects of the 2003 dividend
and capital gain tax cuts assuming that they are temporary. However, their
model incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity and they do not isolate the incentive
eﬀects from the timing eﬀects of tax cuts. In a setting where the government
is subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, and capital taxes in any
period are stochastic, Dotsey [1994] shows that lowering taxes on capital and
ﬁnancing government spending by higher deﬁcit reduces investment. In con-
trast, my paper considers deterministic tax rate and is in line with Heathcote
[2005] 2 who quantiﬁes the short-run eﬀects of temporary personal income tax
cuts on households’ optimal consumption. Heathcote [2005] ﬁnds that the
eﬀects of temporary tax cuts are higher when the tax is proportional to the
household income than when it is lump-sum.
This paper begins by extending the Ricardian equivalence result to the ﬁrm
side. More precisely, it establishes that if capital markets are perfect and all
agents live inﬁnitely, the representative ﬁrm should not change its investment
plan in response to temporary changes in lump-sum corporate proﬁt tax,
which maintain the present value of tax burden unchanged. The logic is that
when tax decreases, the ﬁrm uses the extra cash ﬂows provided by the tax
cut to pay more dividends or to repurchase equity. Stockholders save the
extra revenue by investing in government debt. When government increases
tax later, the ﬁrm reduces dividend payments or issue new equity to ﬁnance
the higher tax, leaving its investment plan unaﬀected. The representative
household keeps its consumption plan unchanged and uses its savings plus
interest to buy new equity issued by the ﬁrm, or to compensate the reduction
in revenue due to lower dividend payments. As a result, all adjustment takes
place through changes in the capital structure of the ﬁrm and implies no real
2. The literature on Ricardian equivalence is summarized by Seater [1993] and Ricciuti
[2003]
4eﬀects. This result is consistent with the well-known Modigliani and Miller
[1958] theorem, which states that the capital structure of ﬁrms has no eﬀect
on their investment in a frictionless environment.
Afterwards, I consider a framework in which the ﬁrm chooses investment and
ﬁnancing policies subject to dividend constraint and equity issuance costs.
In this case, the capital structure of the ﬁrm matters and the ﬁrm uses
external ﬁnancing only if it is dividend-constrained. I use this framework to
assess how ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect the dynamics of the economy following
temporary tax cuts. More precisely, I assume that the economy is initially in
a steady-state where the ﬁrm is dividend-constrained. Then, the government
unexpectedly implements a tax cut, large enough to relax the constraint on
the ﬁrm’s decisions. The results show that the investment response varies
both quantitatively and qualitatively, depending on the tax instrument as
well as on the marginal cost of external ﬁnancing. These ﬁndings are driven
by two opposite forces. One on hand, the tax cut reduces the marginal cost of
investment because it allows the ﬁrm to use retained-earnings as the source
of investment ﬁnancing, avoiding the additional cost associated with equity
issuance. Thus, the size of the tax incentives depends on the marginal cost
of external ﬁnance. More precisely, the higher the cost of equity issuance,
the higher is the reduction in the marginal cost of investment. 3 When the
tax is lump-sum, these direct beneﬁts imply an increase in investment. On
the other hand, the expectation of high future tax rates reduces the expected
marginal return on investment and mitigates the direct beneﬁts of the tax cut
when tax is proportional to corporate proﬁt. The dominant eﬀect depends on
how costly are the ﬁnancial frictions in place before the tax cut. For relatively
lower marginal costs of equity issuance, the adverse eﬀects of expected high
tax rates oﬀset the direct beneﬁts provided by the tax cut and investment
decreases. In contrast, the tax cut implies positive propensities to invest if
equity issuance is highly costly. As illustration, the sensitivity analysis shows
that the propensity of investment goes from negative to positive values as
the cost of external ﬁnancing varies from 1 cent to 6 cents per dollar of new
equity issued. This ﬁnding is consistent with the results of Dotsey [1994]
who showed that a temporary reduction in capital tax, ﬁnanced by future
tax-increase, implies a reduction in investment.
3. The benchmark calibration uses a value of κ = 0.027 which is in the range of direct
estimates in the literature. For example Gomes [2001], Altinkiliç and Hansen [2000] and
Hennessy and Whited [2005] estimate cost of external ﬁnancing equal to 0.028, 0.0515 and
0.0509, respectively. Gourio and Miao [2011] in a framework similar to mine set κ to 0.03.
51.2 Model
Time is discrete and runs from t = 0 to ∞. The economy consists of a
representative household, a representative ﬁrm, and a government.
1.2.1 Firm
A representative ﬁrm combines labor Nt and capital Kt to produce a ﬁnal
good using a Cobb-Douglas production technology with a Constant Return
to Scale (CRS), Yt = Kαt , N
1−α
t . Physical capital depreciates geometrically
at rate δ leading to the following law motion of capital:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (1.1)
where It is the investment at period t and Kt the capital stock at the begin-
ning of period t.
The ﬁrm may issue new shares or repurchase old shares. Thus, the price of the
ﬁrm at date t+1 satisﬁes: Pt+1 = P 0t+1 +Zt+1, where Zt+1 denotes the value
of new shares issued (repurchased) at period t+1 if Zt+1 ≥ (<)0, and P 0t+1 is
the period t+1 value of equity outstanding in period t. The managers of the
ﬁrm act on behalf of the stockholders in order to maximize the value of the
ﬁrm. The net after-tax return to the owners of the ﬁrm at time t comprises
current dividends and capital gains. Under the assumption of no uncertainty
and perfect capital markets, the return on ﬁrms’ shares must equal the return
on government bonds, rt+1, if the owners are to be content holding their
shares in equilibrium. Then, if Dt+1 denotes the dividend payments of the
ﬁrm at period t+1, rt+1 =
(P 0t+1 − Pt) +Dt+1
Pt
where the term in parentheses
represents the capital gain component of the return. The equity value of the
ﬁrm stems from the non-arbitrage condition governing the valuation of its
shares and can be derived as:
Pt =
(Pt+1 − Zt+1) +Dt+1
1 + rt+1
(1.2)
I follow Gourio and Miao [2010] and deﬁne the cum- dividend equity value,
Vt+1, at period t+ 1 as:
Vt+1 = Pt+1 − Zt+1 +Dt+1 (1.3)
6Using (1.2):
Vt = Pt − Zt +Dt = Dt − Zt + Vt+1
1 + rt+1
(1.4)
In the absence of any bubbles, solving (1.4) forward and using the transver-
sality condition on stock prices, lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
(1 + rt)
−1PT+1 = 0, yields the ﬁrm’s
market value at period 0 given by (1.5).
V0 =
+∞∑
t=0
Λ0,t (Dt − Zt) (1.5)
Here Λ0,t =
t−1∏
i=0
Λi,i+1 =
t−1∏
i=0
1
1 + ri+1
is the ﬁrm’s discount factor between
periods 0 and t. The value of the ﬁrm is simply the present discounted value
of its future dividend stream. This speciﬁcation implies that dividends are
paid out at the end of the period. The ﬁrm takes employment, investment
and ﬁnancing decisions to maximize its market value (1.5) subject to the law
motion of capital (1.1), and its resource constraint:
Dt = F (Kt, Nt) + Zt − wtNt − It − τt (1.6)
where τ is a lump-sum tax on corporate proﬁts. Dividends are deﬁned as the
the ﬁrm’s residual proﬁts after expenditures. Cash inﬂows include current
output and undepreciated capital, while cash outﬂows consist of dividend
and factor payments, tax liability and investment expenditures. Under the
assumption of perfect capital markets, the capital structure does not mat-
ter for the ﬁrm’s value. In other words, it does not matter for the ﬁrm’s
value and investment policy how much earnings to retain for use as internal
ﬁnancing, rather than distributing dividends and raising new equity in the
external equity market. More precisely in the ﬁrm’s problem, the payout
Dt − Zt can be determined but Dt and Zt will be undetermined. This is the
Modigliani and Miller [1958] dividend policy irrelevance theorem. Thus, for
the remainder of this section, I deﬁne for simplicity the payouts of the ﬁrm
as dt:
dt = Dt − Zt (1.7)
Substituting sequentially (1.7) into (1.6) and (1.5) for dt, and using (1.1)
to eliminate It from the problem, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s
7maximization problem are:
wt = F2(Kt, Nt) (1.8a)
1 = Λt,t+1 (F1(Kt+1, Nt+1) + 1− δ) (1.8b)
Equation (1.8a) implies that wage equals the marginal product of labor. The
left-hand side of equation (1.8b) shows the marginal cost of investing one unit
of output in physical capital. The right-hand side represents the discounted
marginal beneﬁt of investing in capital. The return on investment consists
of the marginal product of capital and the undepreciated capital. Along the
optimal path, the marginal cost of investment must equal the marginal gain
from investment. In addition, equation (1.8b) implies that the return on
investment in physical capital equals the discount factor of the ﬁrm.
1.2.2 Household
A representative household with unit measure derives utility from consump-
tion alone, according to a standard time-additive utility function U(C) =
logC, with future utility discounted at rate 0 < β < 1. A time endowment
of 1 is supplied inelastically every period.
The household trades equity shares in the ﬁrm, as well as a government bond.
Let θt denote the shareholding at the start of period t valued at price P 0t , Pt
the equity price at the end of period t (including capital gain in t) and Bt+1
the government bondholding paying interest rate rt.
The problem of the representative household can be derived as follows:
max
Ct,Bt+1,θt+1
+∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct) (1.9)
subject to
Bt+1 + Ct + θt+1Pt = wt + θt(P
0
t +Dt) + (1 + rt)Bt (1.10a)
lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
(1 + rt)
−1BT+1 ≥ 0 (1.10b)
lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
(1 + rt)
−1θT+1 ≥ 0 (1.10c)
8Equation (1.10a) is the household’s budget constraint. The household’s in-
come consists of labor earnings, plus the income from government bond-
holding, plus shareholding income. The consumer spends his resources on
consumption, government bonds, and equity purchases.
Equations (1.10b) and (1.10c) represent the no-Ponzi game constraints on
government bonds and ﬁrm’s shares holdings, respectively.
First-Order Conditions
U ′(Ct) = β(1 + rt)U ′(Ct+1) (1.11a)
PtU
′(Ct) = βU ′(Ct+1)(P 0t+1 +Dt+1) (1.11b)
Equation (1.11b) implies that the stock price Pt is given by the discounted
present value of dividends. In addition, equations (1.11a-1.11b) imply that
the gross return on government bonds equals the inter temporal marginal rate
of substitution of consumption, which equals the return on ﬁrm’s shares.
1.2.3 Government
Government spends a constant amount of resources G > 0 at each time t,
funded either by lump sum corporate taxation τt, or by issuing one period
debt Bt+1 held by the representative consumer. The government’s budget
constraint is
(1 + rt)Bt +G = τt + Bt+1,
together with the no Ponzi game condition:
lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
(1 + rt)
−1BT+1 ≤ 0. (1.12)
Requiring that the government wastes no resources and therefore satisﬁes
the no Ponzi game condition with equality, I obtain the present value budget
constraint:
B0 +G
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + ri)
−1 =
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + ri)
−1τt, (1.13)
where I assume B0 = 0.
The government’s policy will be a sequence {τt, Bt+1}∞t=0 of tax rates and
debt issuance which satisﬁes (1.13).
91.2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
Given the government policy {τt, Bt+1}+∞t=0 , a competitive equilibrium consists
of a set of prices {wt, rt, Pt}+∞t=0 , and allocations {Ct, Nt, Kt+1, Bt+1, dt, θt+1}+∞t=0 ,
such that: the household optimizes given prices, the ﬁrm optimizes given
prices and the tax rate, the government satisﬁes its inter-temporal budget
constraint and all markets (good, ﬁrm’s shares, bond and labor) clear.
Now I am in position to derive a Ricardian equivalence result with corporate
tax.
1.2.5 Ricardian Equivalence with Corporate Taxation
Proposition 1. Ricardian Equivalence Statement
Given initial conditions (B0, K0), and a government spending G 4, let the set
of allocations {Ct, Nt, Kt+1, Bt+1, θt, dt}+∞t=0 and prices {wt, rt, Pt}+∞t=0 , be an
initial equilibrium under a government policy {τt, Bt+1}+∞t=0 .
If
{
Cˆt, Nˆt, Kˆt+1, Bˆt+1, θˆt, dˆt
}+∞
t=0
and
{
wˆt, rˆt, Pˆt
}+∞
t=0
constitute another equilib-
rium with a government policy
{
τˆt, Bˆt+1
}+∞
t=0
, such that:
+∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + rˆi)
−1τˆt =
+∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + ri)
−1τt. Then:
{
Cˆt, Nˆt, Kˆt+1, θˆt
}+∞
t=0
= {Ct, Nt, Kt+1, θt}+∞t=0{
wˆt, rˆt, Pˆt
}+∞
t=0
= {wt, rt, Pt}+∞t=0
dˆt + τˆt = F (Kt, Nt) + (1− δ)Kt − wtNt −Kt+1
Bˆt+1 −RtBˆt − dˆt = wtNt − Ct
Bˆt+1 + τˆt −RtBˆt = G
According to the theorem, the temporal pattern of lump-sum tax required to
ﬁnance a particular public expenditure stream is irrelevant to the determi-
nation of real variables of the economy. That is, substituting taxes today for
taxes plus interest tomorrow via debt ﬁnancing aﬀects neither the investment
decision of the ﬁrm, nor the wealth of the individuals. The reason is that
4. While I have assumed constant government spending in the previous sections, the
result does not require such assumption to be valid.
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under perfect capital markets, inﬁnitely lived and perfect foresighted private
agents can exactly undo any ﬁnancing policy undertaken by the government 5.
Given the Barro [1974]’s Ricardian equivalence result, the statement estab-
lished here is not surprising but it has some implications which are absent
in the standard Ricardian equivalence analysis. For instance, it helps char-
acterizing the eﬀects of the policy on the optimal decisions of the ﬁrm and
their transmission channel to other variables in the economy. In addition, it
is useful for understanding the dynamics of the economy when I depart from
the Ricardian framework.
1.3 Departure from the Ricardian Result
As in the standard Ricardian equivalence theorem, the result established in
proposition 1 will fail if one or more of the assumptions behind the result are
violated. In this paper, I focus on two important deviations from the basic
framework. First, I impose a lower bound on dividend payment and intro-
duce costly external ﬁnancing. Afterwards, I consider proportional rather
than lump-sum corporate taxation. Let me start with the ﬁnancial market
imperfection.
1.3.1 Financing Frictions
The analysis of the eﬀects of temporary tax cuts on ﬁrm decisions requires a
model that departs from Modigliani-Miller. I consider a simple way to achieve
this by imposing two standard constraints on ﬁrm ﬁnancing decisions.
First, I impose a lower bound on dividend payments. A possible interpreta-
tion is that the ﬁrm has an established dividend practice that leads stockhold-
ers to expect a minimum dividend payment, Dˆ, after each operating year.
In the U.S., Poterba et al. [1987] presented evidence of remarkable stability
of dividend payouts throughout periods of extensive tax changes. Since the
stock of capital Kt is given at the beginning of each period, the only vari-
ables under the control of the ﬁrm are the input of labor, Nt, the dividend
payment, Dt, and the equity issuance Zt. Thus, if the ﬁrm is dividend-
constrained and it wishes to keep the production plan unchanged, it needs
to issue new equity to ﬁnance investment. Second, I follow Gomes [2001]
and assume that each additional dollar of new equity implies an additional
5. A detailed analytical proof is given in annex A.1.
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cost of κ, 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. This cost of equity issuance can be interpreted as
transaction costs as pointed out by some researchers in the literature. For
instance, Greenwald et al. [1984] and Myers and Majluf [1984] ﬁnd that cap-
ital market frictions increase the cost of outside capital relative to internally
generated funds. Without this constraint, ﬁrms would be able to raise enough
equity to ﬁnance desired investment and the dividend constraint would be
useless. Although share repurchases are allowed in the United States, I im-
pose no share-repurchases constraint similarly to Auerbach [2002], Gomes
[2001], Desai and Goolsbee [2004], Hennessy and Whited [2005] and Gourio
and Miao [2010], for simplicity. In addition, I abstract from debt 6 and as-
sume that ﬁrms are all equity ﬁnanced. Incorporating debt ﬁnancing would
complicate my analysis since I would need to include debt as an additional
state variable in the dynamic programming problem of the ﬁrm.
Now, I consider the ﬁrm’s problem in the presence of ﬁnancing frictions.
1.3.2 Firm’s Problem with Lump-sum Taxation
I start by the model with lump-sum tax and consider the model with propor-
tional tax later on. When tax is lump-sum, the representative ﬁrm’s problem
is as follows.
max
{Dt,Nt,It,Kt+1,Zt}+∞t=0
+∞∑
t=0
Λ0,t(Dt − Zt)
subject to:
Dt = K
α
t N
1−α
t + Zt − κZt − wtNt − It − τt (1.14a)
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (1.14b)
Dt ≥ Dˆ (1.14c)
Zt ≥ 0 (1.14d)
K0 given
Let qt, λdt and λ
z
t be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints
(1.14b)-(1.14d), respectively. Using (1.14a) to eliminate Dt, the ﬁrst-order
conditions are:
6. Auerbach and Hassett [2003], Desai and Goolsbee [2004], and Gourio and Miao
[2010] among others make this choice.
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First Order Conditions
Nt : wt = (1− α)Kαt N−αt (1.15a)
It : qt = 1 + λ
d
t (1.15b)
Kt+1 : qt = Λt,t+1(1 + λ
d
t+1)
(
αKα−1t+1 N
1−α
t+1 + 1− δ
)
(1.15c)
Zt : 1 = (1− κ)(1 + λdt ) + λzt (1.15d)
The usual transversality conditions and the complementary slackness condi-
tions are omitted here for simplicity.
Proposition 2. Under lump-sum tax, the Ricardian equivalence result holds
if Dˆ = −∞.
Proof: Dˆ = −∞ implies that the dividend constraint will never binds.
Thus, λdt = 0, λ
z
t = κ > 0, and the conditions characterizing the competitive
equilibrium are identical to those characterizing the ﬁrm’s problem in the
absence of frictions. The intuition is that if the ﬁrm is allowed to issue an
inﬁnite amount of new equity, i.e. to pay inﬁnite negative dividend, it will
never be dividend-constrained.
1.3.3 Firm’s Problem with Proportional Taxation
When tax is proportional to corporate proﬁt, the ﬁrm problem is as follows.
max
{Dt,Nt,It,Kt+1,Zt}+∞t=0
+∞∑
t=0
Λ0,t(Dt − Zt) (1.16)
subject to:
Dt = (1− τt)
[
Kαt N
1−α
t − wtNt
]
+ τtδKt + (1− κ)Zt − It (1.17a)
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (1.17b)
Dt ≥ Dˆ (1.17c)
Zt ≥ 0 (1.17d)
K0 given
Let qt, λdt and λ
z
t be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints
(1.17b)-(1.17d), respectively. Equation (1.17a) implies that depreciation is
tax deductible. Using (1.17a) to eliminate Dt, the ﬁrst-order conditions are:
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Nt : wt = (1− α)Kαt N−αt (1.18a)
It : qt = 1 + λ
d
t (1.18b)
Kt+1 : qt = Λt,t+1(1 + λ
d
t+1)
[
(1− τt+1)
(
αKα−1t+1 N
1−α
t+1 − δ
)
+ 1
]
(1.18c)
Zt : 1 = (1− κ)(1 + λdt ) + λzt (1.18d)
1.3.4 Firm’s Financial Policy
I analyze the ﬁnancing and investment decisions of the representative ﬁrm
in the presence of ﬁnancing frictions under both lump sum and proportional
corporate proﬁt taxes. I begin by analyzing the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy, hold-
ing the investment policy ﬁxed. The ﬁnancial policy of the ﬁrm is determined
by equations (1.15d) and (1.18d) under lump-sum and proportional taxation,
respectively. These two equations are identical. Accordingly, the type of the
tax does not matter for the ﬁnancial decision of the ﬁrm. For the remainder
of this section, I consider equation (1.18d), which has the following interpre-
tation: raising one unit of new equity to pay dividends relaxes the dividend
constraint and the share repurchase constraint. In addition, when the ﬁrm
raises one unit of new equity, the shareholder receives 1 − κ because equity
issuance involves an additional marginal cost of κ. Thus, the expression
on the right-hand side of equation (1.18d) gives the marginal beneﬁt to the
shareholder. On the other hand, a one-unit increase in new shares lowers eq-
uity value by one unit, and the expression on the left-hand side of equation
(1.18d) represents the marginal cost to the shareholder. Equation (1.18d)
requires that the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost must be equal at
equilibrium.
If external ﬁnancing is costless, meaning κ = 0, there is no diﬀerence between
internal ﬁnancing and external ﬁnancing. Equation (1.18d) implies that λdt =
λzt = 0. In this case, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy is irrelevant. Thus, it does
not matter for the ﬁrm’s value and investment policy how much earnings to
retain for use as internal ﬁnancing, rather than distributing dividends and
raising new equity in the external equity market. In this case, the Ricardian
equivalence result holds if tax is lump-sum.
7. The usual transversality conditions and the complementary slackness conditions are
omitted here for simplicity.
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In contrast, if new equity issuance is costly, i.e. κ > 0, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
policy matters. In this case, it follows from equation (1.18d) that it can not
be true that λdt = λ
z
t = 0. For instance, equation (1.18d) shows ﬁrst that if
λdt = 0, then λ
z
t = κ > 0. This means that if the dividend constraint is not
binding, then the share repurchase constraint is binding. In other words, it is
not optimal for the ﬁrm to issue new equity if it is not dividend-constrained
because equity issuance is costly. I refer to the case where the dividend con-
straint is not binding as the internal ﬁnancing or retained-earnings ﬁnancing
regime. Second, equation (1.18d) shows that if λzt = 0, then λ
d
t =
κ
1− κ > 0.
That is, if the ﬁrm is issuing new equity, then the dividend constraint is
binding. In this case, the ﬁrm is in the external ﬁnancing or equity issuance
regime.
In summary, equation (1.18d) implies that the ﬁrm will use external ﬁnancing
if and only if the dividend constraint is binding. The reason is that it is not
optimal for the ﬁrm to simultaneously distribute more dividend than Dˆ and
issue new equity. In fact, one unit of new equity reduces the equity value by
one unit, whereas shareholders receive only 1−κ. If the ﬁrm is not dividend-
constrained, using retained earnings to ﬁnance investment is costless.
1.3.5 Firm’s Investment Policy
The ﬁrm’s investment policy is governed by equations (1.18c) and (1.18b)
under proportional taxation, or (1.15c) and (1.15b) under lump sum taxation.
Equations (1.18b) and (1.15b) show that the nature of the tax does not
aﬀect the marginal cost of investment, which depends only on the dividend
constraint, and the share-repurchase constraint. In other words, the marginal
cost of investment depends solely on the marginal source of ﬁnance.
If the dividend constraint is binding, the marginal source of ﬁnance is new
equity. In this case, Zt > 0 and λzt = 0. Using equation (1.18d), λ
d
t =
κ
1− κ
and I can derive the investment equation:
qt =
1
1− κ (1.19)
Thus a dividend-constrained ﬁrm stops investing when the marginal product
of investment, qt, equals the cost of ﬁnancing one additional unit of invest-
ment by new equity,
1
1− κ .
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On the other hand, if the ﬁrm is not dividend-constrained, then the marginal
source of ﬁnance is retained-earnings. In this case, Dt > Dˆ and λdt = 0. I
can derive the investment equation:
qt = 1 (1.20)
Thus, the shareholder will stop investing when he or she is indiﬀerent between
receiving one dollar of additional dividend and investing one dollar in ﬁrm’s
shares. That is, he stops investing when the marginal beneﬁt of investing
qt equals the cost of investment. Comparing equations (1.18b) and (1.15b)
reveals that the marginal cost of investment is higher in an equity-issuing
regime than in an internal-ﬁnancing regime.
I now turn to the eﬀect of corporate tax on investment. To this end, I use
equations (1.18b) and (1.18c) to obtain the optimality condition for invest-
ment (1.22), and equations (1.15b) and (1.15c) to obtain (1.21) when tax is
proportional or lump-sum, respectively.
1 + λdt = Λt,t+1(1 + λ
d
t+1)
(
αKα−1t+1 N
1−α
t+1 + 1− δ
)
(1.21)
1 + λdt = Λt,t+1(1 + λ
d
t+1)
[
(1− τt+1)
(
αKα−1t+1 N
1−α
t+1 − δ
)
+ 1
]
(1.22)
When the tax is lump-sum, equation (1.21) shows that the tax policy does
not inﬂuence investment policy if it does not change the marginal source of
ﬁnance between two adjacent periods. In fact, if the current and the next
marginal sources of ﬁnance are new equity, i.e λzt = λ
z
t+1 = 0 (implying λ
d
t > 0
and λdt+1 > 0), then 1 + λ
d
t = 1 + λ
d
t+1 =
1
1− κ . Similarly, if the current and
the next marginal sources of ﬁnance are retained-earnings, i.e λdt = λ
d
t+1 = 0,
then 1 + λdt = 1 + λ
d
t+1 = 1. In both cases, the factors 1 + λ
d
t and 1 + λ
d
t+1
cancel out in equation(1.21).
In contrast, under proportional tax, the corporate tax policy aﬀects invest-
ment policy even if the marginal source of ﬁnance remains unchanged. More
precisely, a tax cut ﬁnanced by a tax increase one period later will reduce the
expected marginal after-tax return on investment while the marginal cost of
investment remains unchanged. In response, the ﬁrm will reduce investment.
Now, I consider the case where the corporate tax policy changes the marginal
source of ﬁnance between two adjacent periods. In particular, I focus on tax
cuts, which push the marginal source of investment ﬁnancing from equity
to retained earnings. More precisely, I assume that the ﬁrm is initially in a
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steady state where it is dividend-constrained and switches instantaneously
and temporarily to the retained-earnings ﬁnancing regime at the period of
tax cut. One period later, when government increases tax to repay its debt,
the ﬁrm switches back to the external ﬁnancing regime. Under lump sum
taxation, the tax cuts temporarily reduce the marginal cost of investment
from
1
1− κ to 1. Since the tax policy does not aﬀect the expected marginal
return of investment, equation (1.21), current investment should increase.
However, when the tax is proportional to corporate proﬁts, two forces are
present. A temporary tax cut reduces the current marginal cost of investment
from
1
1− κ to 1 as before, but the higher future tax rate pins down the
after-tax return on current investment. Thus, the net eﬀect on investment
will depend on the relative intensity of each force. If the increase in future
tax rate is more than proportional to the reduction in the marginal cost
of investment, investment will decrease. In contrast, if the decrease in the
marginal cost of investment fully oﬀsets the reduction in after-tax return on
investment, investment will increase. Equations (1.19) and (1.20) show that
the reduction in marginal cost of investment,
κ
1− κ , is an increasing function
of the additional cost, κ, induced by external ﬁnancing.
1.3.6 Other Agents’ Problems
The household’s problems under the two types of tax are identical to the
household problem in the basic framework. In contrast, the government
policy is aﬀected by the type of tax. Under lump-sum tax, its problem in
the presence of external costly ﬁnancing is the same as in the benchmark
problem. I focus now on the government problem when tax is proportional.
When tax is proportional to corporate proﬁts, the government budget is given
by:
RtBt +G = τt
[
Kαt N
1−α
t − wtNt − δKt
]
+ Bt+1 (1.23)
Again, it may run a deﬁcit in the short to medium term, but is not allowed to
play a Ponzi game with other agents. Accordingly, its inter-temporal budget
constraint is:
B0 +G
+∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
R−1i =
+∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
R−1i τt
[
Kαt N
1−α
t − wtNt − δKt
]
(1.24)
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The deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium under both types of tax in the
presence of costly external ﬁnancing is similar to the deﬁnition in the basic
framework.
1.4 Steady State Properties
This section derives some properties 8 of the long-run equilibrium of the econ-
omy which ensure the feasibility of the tax experiments undertaken later on.
I focus particularly on a steady state with zero government debt.
Proposition 3. The steady state stock of capital does not depend on the
target of dividend under either lump-sum taxation or proportional taxation.
Proposition 4. A higher proportional tax rate implies lower capital stock at
steady state while lump-sum tax does not aﬀect long-run capital stock.
The reason is that a proportional tax reduces the after-tax marginal return
on investment while lump-sum tax does not.
Proof: With lump-sum tax K lumpss =
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) 1
1−α
. Under propor-
tional tax Kpropss =
[
αβ(1− τ¯)
1− β + δβ(1− τ¯)
] 1
1−α
and
∂Kpropss
∂τ¯
< 0.
Lemma 1. Under lump-sum tax, a government spending G is feasible at a
zero debt steady state if and only if G < Gˆl, with:
Gˆl =
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
[
(1− α)(1− κ) + α(1− β)
(1− β(1− δ))
]
− Dˆκ
Lemma 1 shows that under lump-sum tax, it is not feasible to ﬁnance more
than Gˆl in a sustainable way even when the ﬁrm produces optimally and all
the production is entirely devoted to ﬁnance government spending.
Assumption 1. Assume that: Dˆ ≤ Dˆhil ≡
1− β
β
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) 1
1−α
.
8. Detailed proofs of all results derived here are given in Annex A.1.
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Proposition 5. Under lump-sum tax, if assumption 1 is violated, then the
ﬁrm will be constrained at steady state regardless of the size of the govern-
ment.
This result implies that if the shareholders request more dividend payment
than the return on their investment, the ﬁrm will be issuing new equities
to pay dividend and to ﬁnance investment. In fact, Dˆhil is the interest rate
times the value of capital at steady state and it is meaningful to assume
that a stockholder may not require a dividend higher than the return on its
investment.
Proposition 6. Let assumption 1 hold. Then, the ﬁrm will be in the equity-
issuing regime if and only if the government size is larger than G¯l ≡ Dˆhil −Dˆ.
This result derives the maximum receipt that the government can raise by
using lump-sum tax without distorting the ﬁrm’s investment.
Assumption 2. Assume that Dˆ < Dˆlol ≡ −(1− α)
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
.
Proposition 7. Assume that assumption 2 holds. Then: G¯l < Gˆl.
The proposition implies that there exists a range of feasible government size
which constrains the ﬁrm to using equity as a marginal source of investment
ﬁnancing.
Lemma 2. At the zero government debt steady state, the tax receipt is a
non-linear function of the proportional tax rate. That is:
G(τ) =
(
αβ(1− τ)
1− β + δβ(1− τ)
) α
1−α α(1− β)τ
1− β + δβ(1− τ)
In addition, there exists a critical tax rate τˆp, 0 < τˆp < 1 so that the tax
revenue is increasing (respectively decreasing) in τ if and only if τ < τˆp (
respectively τ > τˆp) where τˆp =
(1− β + δβ)(1− α)
1− β + δβ(1− α) . The maximum tax rev-
enue that government can collect in a zero debt steady state using proportional
tax is: Gˆp = α(1− α)
(
α2β
1− β + δβ
) α
1−α
.
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Figure 1.1: Laﬀer Curve
Lemma 2 shows that the tax receipt is increasing in the tax rate for tax rates
lower than τˆp. However beyond τˆp, an additional increase in the marginal tax
rate results in a lower tax revenue. This is the well known Laﬀer Curve. The
reason is that beyond τˆp, the elasticity of the corporate proﬁt to the marginal
tax rate is higher than that of the tax receipt to the marginal tax rate. As
a result, the proﬁt decreases more than proportionally to the increase in tax
rate. Thus, it is suboptimal for the government to raise the tax rate beyond
τˆp. Figure 1.1 plots the evolution of government receipt as a function of tax
rate for standard values of technology and preference parameters presented
in Table 1.1.
Proposition 8. Let Dˆlop ≡
1− β
β
[
α2β
1− β + αδβ2 + δβ − δβ2
] 1
1−α
and
Dˆhip ≡
1− β
β
(α
δ
) 1
1−α .
For α, β, δ, κ satisfying 0 < α, β, δ, κ < 1: Dˆlol < Dˆ
lo
p < Dˆ
hi
l < Dˆ
hi
p .
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Assumption 3. Assume that: Dˆ < Dˆhil =
1− β
β
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) 1
1−α
.
Proposition 9. If assumption 3 holds, then there exists a critical tax rate
τ¯p, 0 < τ¯p < 1 such that the ﬁrm will be dividend-constrained if and only if
τ > τ¯p, with τ¯p =
αβα(1− β)1−α − Dˆ1−α(1− β + δβ)
αβα(1− β)1−α − δβDˆ1−α
and the corresponding
government spending is: G¯p = α
(
βDˆ
1− β
)α
− δβDˆ
1− β − Dˆ.
Assumption 4. Assume that: Dˆlop < Dˆ < Dˆ
hi
p .
Lemma 3. Let assumption 4 hold. Then, 0 < τ¯p < τˆp < 1.
When assumption 3 holds, proposition 9 derives the tax rate, τ¯p, above which
the ﬁrm will be forced to issue new equity to ﬁnance investment under pro-
portional taxation. For standard values of technology and preference pa-
rameters, the blue and red lines in Figure 1.1 plot the tax rates τ¯p, and τˆp,
respectively. In order to compare the eﬀects of lump sum tax cuts and those
of reductions in proportional tax rates, it is meaningful to consider tax cuts
which imply the same reduction in government revenue. Proposition 8 en-
sures that it is feasible to consider such tax cuts experiments starting from
initial steady-states where the dividend constraint is binding. Lemma 3 has
some important implications for the policy experiments considered in this
paper. It provides suﬃcient conditions on dividend target, which guaran-
tee the existence of a feasible tax rate such that the dividend constraint is
binding at initial steady state. For the policy experiments in this paper, I
consider dividend targets which satisfy these conditions.
1.5 Eﬀects of Temporary Tax Cuts
I ﬁrst use the closed-form solution to determine the long run equilibrium of
the model. Next, I ﬁx a length for the transition and solve for the transitional
dynamics following tax cut by backward induction.The detailed algorithm is
presented in annex A.2.
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1.5.1 Parameterization
The parameter values are set to illustrate the workings of the model and do
not intend to match the real business cycle data. However, I still require
these parameters to be within the range of values estimated or calibrated by
other studies in the literature. I assume that a time-period in the model cor-
responds to one year in the data and the capital share is set to 1/3 as in the
macroeconomic literature. The marginal cost of external ﬁnancing, κ, is set
to 0.027 closed to the estimated value 0.028 by Gomes [2001]. As the quanti-
tative exercise is done for illustration, the values of the remaining parameters
are similar to standard values used in the literature, while ensuring the well
functioning of the model. The parameter values are summarized in Table
1.1. These parameters values imply that the tax rate, τ¯p, above which the
Table 1.1: Baseline Parameterization
Description Parameter Value
Capital income share α 0.33
Discount factor β 0.959
Depreciation rate δ 0.101
Marginal cost of external ﬁnancing κ 0.027
Lower Bound on Dividend Dˆ 0.113
ﬁrm is dividend-constrained at steady state is equal to the highest US federal
statutory corporate rate of 39%. This tax rate is high enough so that large
tax cuts which allow temporary switching of ﬁnancing regime are feasible
under both lump sum and proportional taxation. The critical proportional
tax rate, τˆp, corresponding to the maximum feasible government spending is
equal to 87%. These tax rates imply that the set of feasible tax rates, for
which the dividend constraint is binding at steady state under both lump-
sum and proportional taxes, is non-empty (]τ¯p, τˆp[ = {φ}). In addition, τ¯p is
located on the upward section of the Laﬀer Curve (τ¯p < τˆp), ensuring that
there is a room to simulate policy experiments in which ﬁrms are initially
constrained.
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1.5.2 Policy Experiments
I assume exogenous and time-invariant government spending, and zero gov-
ernment debt in steady-state to isolate eventual eﬀects associated with changes
in government size. Figure 1.2 presents a typical experiment in which the
government uses a lump-sum tax to raise revenue.
The blue solid line represents the tax level corresponding to the maximum
feasible government spending. The black line is the tax level at steady state
and is equal to the exogenous size of the government. The blue dashed line
refers to the critical level of tax above which the dividend constraint is binding
at steady state. The green line shows the evolution of the government debt.
The economy is initially in a steady-state where the dividend constraint is
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Figure 1.2: Timing of Tax Cut
binding. At period 2, the government unexpectedly cuts tax, large enough
to relax the dividend constraint. The ﬁrm then temporarily switches to a
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retained-earnings ﬁnancing regime. The government issues one-period debt
to ﬁnance the deﬁcit induced by the tax cut. Once the tax cut occurs, all
agents have perfect foresight about the future tax path. At period 3, the
government increases tax to repay its debt and related service. From period
3 and onwards, the economy goes through a transition but converges to the
initial steady state because the tax rate and the government debt revert to
their steady-state values after period 4.
Table 1.2: Description of Experiments
Lump-sum tax Proportional tax
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Steady tax rate 0.1635 0.5250 0.15 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
Rate after tax cut 0.1058 0.0621 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Equity issuance cost κ 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.01 0.04 0.06
I perform several tax experiments to assess the theoretical implications of
the model. Table 1.2 presents the description of all experiments. Tax is
lump-sum in experiments 1 and 2 and proportional in experiments 3 to 7.
To ensure comparability, I set the lump-sum tax rates under experiments
1 and 2 to equal the government revenue under experiments 3 and 4 when
tax is proportional, respectively. In experiments 1 and 3, the steady-state
tax rate is chosen so that the ﬁrm is initially unconstrained. Thus, the tax
cuts do not imply a change in the marginal source of ﬁnance between two
adjacent periods. In this case, any diﬀerences between the dynamics of the
economy after policy experiments 1 and 3 should be fully explained by the
the distortionary eﬀects of the proportional tax. In the other experiments,
the ﬁrm is initially in equity issuance regime and the tax cuts temporar-
ily relax the constraint on the ﬁrm, allowing it to temporarily switch to a
retained-earnings ﬁnancing regime. All diﬀerences between the dynamics of
the economy under experiments 1 and 2 are due to the presence of ﬁnancing
frictions.
1.5.3 Transitional Dynamics After Tax Cuts
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 present the transitional dynamics of the economy after tax
cuts. In all experiments, the economy converges back to steady-steady-state
after around 30 periods.
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Let start with Figure 1.3 which plots the dynamics of the economy in ex-
periments 1 and 3. In these experiments, the economy is initially in steady
state where the ﬁrm is in internal ﬁnance regime. The proportional tax rate
is 15%, and the government decreases it to 10% at period 2. The black and
the red lines in Figure 1.3 plot the dynamics of the economy under lump-
sum and proportional taxes, respectively. In each panel, the horizontal axis
measures the time period. The vertical axes measure the absolute values in
the ﬁrst two columns, and the percentage deviation from the initial steady
state before the tax cuts in the last column.
Under both lump-sum and proportional tax, this policy does not change the
marginal source of ﬁnancing. Since external ﬁnancing is costly and the ﬁrm is
not dividend-constrained, it stays in the internal ﬁnancing regime and equity
issuance is equal to zero during the whole transition.
When the tax is lump-sum, the black line shows that the ﬁrm devotes all the
tax cut to dividend payment at the tax cut period. It keeps its investment
plan unchanged because the lump-sum tax aﬀects neither the marginal cost,
nor the return on investment. As the after interest rate is unchanged, the tax
cut does not distort the inter-temporal consumption decisions of the house-
hold. Accordingly, the consumer maintains its consumption plan unchanged
and invests all the extra dividend in government bonds. When tax increases
one period later, the ﬁrm reduces dividend payments by the additional tax
liability and keeps its investment plan unchanged. The household uses its
savings plus interest to maintain their consumption path unchanged. As a
result, all the adjustment takes place through the dividend policy of the ﬁrm.
The red line shows that under proportional tax, the ﬁrm reduces investment
and increase dividend by more than the total amount of the tax cut. This
behavior is explained by the eﬀect of the tax cut on the future tax policy.
In fact, the expectation of higher tax in the future reduces the after-tax
return on current investment. This expectation of low after-tax returns on
investment provides disincentives for ﬁrm’s investment in capital. As after-
tax interest rate falls, households are induced to save less and to consume
more. As a result, a temporary cut in proportional corporate proﬁt tax boosts
consumption at the expense of lower investment. These investment dynamics
are consistent with the ﬁndings of previous researches. For instance, Dotsey
[1994] ﬁnd that a temporary cut on capital tax, followed by a tax increase,
reduces investment.
In summary, the ﬁrm behaves in a Ricardian fashion when the tax is lump-
sum and ﬁnancial markets are perfect. However, the expectation of future
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Figure 1.3: Transitional Dynamics without Financing Frictions
high tax rate reduces investment when the tax is proportional to corporate
proﬁts.
Now, I consider an economy with ﬁnancial frictions. As described in Table
1.2, the economy is initially in a steady state where the tax rate equals 41%
and the ﬁrm is dividend-constrained. Then, the government cuts tax to 5%.
This tax relief is large enough to temporarily release the dividend constraint
under both lump-sum and proportional taxes. The black and the red lines in
Figure 1.4 plot the dynamics of the economy under lump-sum and propor-
tional tax, respectively. They show that in the initial steady state, dividend
payments are equal to the lower bound and the ﬁrm ﬁnances investment by
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Figure 1.4: Transitional Dynamics with Financing Frictions
issuing new equity. At period 2 when tax decreases, the additional cash ﬂows
provided by the tax cuts allow the ﬁrm to increase dividend payments above
the lower bound. Thus, the ﬁrm switches from equity-issuance regime to
internal ﬁnancing regime and temporarily experiences lower marginal cost of
investment. Equity issuance falls to zero under both taxes at this period.
Moreover, the decrease in investment cost increases the net return on invest-
ment and provides incentives to the ﬁrm to investment more in capital. In
response, the ﬁrm devotes almost all the tax cut to investment. Figure 1.4
shows that investment rises initially by about 8%, then declines below its
steady-state level when tax increases and gradually rises to the steady-state
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level. However, investment increases by less than 1% when the tax is propor-
tional to corporate proﬁt. The reason for this is that when tax is proportional,
the future high tax rate reduces the expected after-tax return. This expecta-
tion of low net after-tax return on investment counteracts the positive eﬀects
of low marginal cost of investment. In response, the ﬁrm increases dividends
relatively more than in an economy with lump-sum taxation. In the bench-
mark simulation, the increase in the net return on investment induced by
the decrease in the marginal investment cost dominates the investment dis-
incentives generated by the expectation of future high tax rate. As a result,
the net investment eﬀect is positive. Under both lump sum and proportional
taxes, higher demand of capital puts upward pressure on interest rate. This
higher return on investment induces the household to consume less and to
save more in government bonds. From period 3 to the steady state, the ﬁrm
switches back to the equity-issuance regime. The marginal cost of invest-
ment increases and ﬁrm reduces investment. In response, interest rate falls
at period 3 and converges monotonically to the steady-state. Consumption
jumps above the steady state when tax rises before declining monotonically
to the steady state.
In a nutshell, temporary cuts in lump-sum tax stimulate investment because
they reduce the marginal investment cost by allowing ﬁrms to avoid the addi-
tional cost associated with external ﬁnancing. When the tax is proportional,
this eﬀect is mitigated by the expectation of high tax in future, which re-
duces the after-tax return on investment. In the benchmark calibration, the
positive eﬀects of the tax cuts oﬀset the adverse eﬀects of future tax rate and
investment increases.
1.5.4 Sensitivity analysis
From the analysis above, the response of investment to temporary reduction
in proportional corporate proﬁt tax is driven by two forces. First, the tax cut
temporarily reduces the marginal cost of investment because the additional
cash ﬂow provided by the tax relief allows the ﬁrm to switch to the internal
ﬁnancing regime. The size of this eﬀect highly depends on the extent of
investment distortion in the economy before the tax cut, which is proportional
to the marginal cost of external ﬁnancing. Second, the expectation of future
high tax rate reduces the expected net return on current investment. Thus,
the ﬁrst eﬀect provides incentives to invest while the last one discourages
investment. Accordingly, the net eﬀect of temporary tax cut on investment
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depends on the relative strength of each force. In this section, I discuss
the sensitivity of the investment response to the amount of frictions in the
economy.
More precisely, I consider proportional corporate proﬁt taxes and simulate
the dynamics of the economy following a reduction of the tax rate from 41%
to 5% for three diﬀerent values of the marginal cost of external ﬁnancing.
I consider values of equity issuance cost in the range of those used 9 by the
macroeconomic literature, κ ∈ {0.01, 0.04, 0.06}. To isolate the eﬀect of the
future tax policy, I start in both experiments from the same steady-state and
implement the same tax cut. Thus, the expectations of future tax increase
are identical in both experiments because the tax cuts generate the same size
of current government deﬁcit. 10 Therefore, any diﬀerence in the investment
dynamics between the three experiments fully results from the diﬀerence in
the cost of equity-issuance.
The black, the red and the blue lines in Figure 1.5 plot the dynamics of the
economy when the cost of equity issuance is 1, 4 and 6 cents, respectively, per
dollar of external funding. In each panel, the horizontal axis measures the
time period. The vertical axes measure the absolute value in the left panel,
and the percentage deviation from the steady state in the right panel. Fig-
ure 1.5 shows that at period 2 when government cuts tax, the ﬁrm increases
dividend payment above the lower bound in all experiments. Consequently,
it temporarily switches from the external ﬁnancing regime to the internal
ﬁnancing regime. One period later when tax increases, equity issuance in-
creases beyond the steady-state level and falls monotonically to steady state.
The main goal in this section is to explain the diﬀerence in the ﬁrm’s re-
sponses between the three simulations in period 2. For instance, Figure 1.5
shows that the size of the increase in dividend payments varies with the
marginal cost of equity issuance. Dividend payments increase by about 70%,
50% and 35% when κ is 0.01, 0.04 and 0.06, respectively. Furthermore, in-
vestment increases by around 10% and 5% if raising one dollar of new equity
costs 6 and 4 cents for the ﬁrm. However, it decreases by more than 3% when
9. Gomes [2001], Altinkiliç and Hansen [2000] and Hennessy and Whited [2005] estimate
the cost of external ﬁnancing equal to 0.028, 0.0515 and 0.0509, respectively. Gourio and
Miao [2011] set κ equals to 0.03.
10. In fact, the tax liability of the ﬁrm at any period in steady-state is given by
liability = τ
[
Kαt N
1−α
t − wtNt − δKt
]
= τ
[
α
(
1− α
wt
) 1−α
α
− δ
]
Kt.
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Figure 1.5: Sensitivity analysis
the cost of external ﬁnancing equals 1 cent per dollar of new equity issued.
The logic behind this result is s follows. The investment incentives provided
by the tax cut are proportional to the extent of investment distortion in the
economy before the tax cut because I have shut down the eﬀects of high future
rate. How distorted the investment is before the tax cuts in turn depends
on the marginal cost of equity issuance, κ. More precisely, the higher the
marginal cost of equity issuance, the higher is the reduction in the marginal
cost of investment, and hence the incentives from the temporary tax relief.
Consequently, for lower values of κ, the negative eﬀects of lower after-tax
return dominate the direct incentives of the tax relief. In response, the ﬁrm
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decreases investment. As the marginal cost of equity issuance increases, the
direct beneﬁts tax cuts increase and oﬀset the disincentives from expecta-
tions of higher future taxes. Accordingly, investment increases. Consistent
with this reasoning, Figure 1.5 shows that the ﬁrm decreases investment for
κ = 0.01, while it increases investment when κ = 0, 06 than if κ = 0.04.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the short run eﬀects of changes in the timing of corporate
taxation in the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections. I analyze the full
transition of the economy following temporary tax cuts ﬁnanced by future tax
increase using a dynamic general equilibrium model in which a representative
ﬁrm takes investment and ﬁnancing decisions subject to equity issuance costs
and dividend constraint. I ﬁrst establish that ﬁrms behave in a Ricardian
fashion when capital markets are perfect and taxes are lump-sum. Second,
I show that changes in the timing of lump-sum tax aﬀect investment if they
imply a change in the marginal source of ﬁnance between two adjacent pe-
riods. In this case, temporary tax cuts followed by subsequent tax increase
provide a boost to investment at the cost of a contraction in consumption.
The result is primarily generated by the reduction in the marginal cost of
investment induced by the switching from costly external ﬁnancing to inter-
nal ﬁnancing regime. Third, when the government uses proportional tax on
corporate proﬁts to ﬁnance its expenditure, temporary tax cuts may have
real eﬀects even if they don’t imply a change in the marginal source of ﬁ-
nancing. The reason is that current tax cuts imply high future tax, inducing
expectation of low after-tax return on current investment. As a result, tax
cuts provide incentives to current consumption, crowding out investment if
capital markets are perfect. When the ﬁrm is initially dividend-constrained
and the tax cut is large enough to relax the constraint, the qualitative as well
as the quantitative eﬀects of tax cuts depend on the extent of distortion on
investment before the tax cuts. More precisely, the net eﬀect is driven by two
opposite forces. On one hand, switching from an equity-issuance regime to an
internal ﬁnancing regime reduces the marginal cost of investment, providing
incentives to investment. On the other hand, current tax cuts imply future
tax-increase, lowering expected after-tax marginal beneﬁt of investment. The
size as well as the sign of the net eﬀect on investment depends on the relative
strength of each eﬀect. The sensitivity analysis shows that the higher the
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marginal cost of equity issuance, the higher is the positive eﬀect of the tax
relief on investment. These ﬁndings suggest that the eﬀects of corporate tax
incentives on investment depend on how constrained the ﬁrm is before the
tax relief. In addition, both the size of the tax cuts and the tax instrument
matter for the eﬃciency of tax incentives in stimulating investment.
The analysis in this paper could be extended along a few directions. Partic-
ularly, ﬁrms are heterogenous in several dimensions. Thus, at any point in
time, diﬀerent ﬁrms may be in diﬀerent ﬁnancing regimes and hence respond
to the temporary corporate tax cut in diﬀerent ways. Therefore, one would
ideally study the policy experiment in an environment with ﬁrm heterogene-
ity. Incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity also allows to quantify the eﬀects of
temporary tax relief.
Chapter 2
Stimulative Eﬀects of Temporary
Corporate Tax Cuts
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2.1 Introduction
Policymakers often rely on temporary corporate tax cuts in order to pro-
vide incentives for business investment in recession times. For example, the
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 temporary reduces
the dividend and capital gains taxes through 2008 to promote growth in the
U.S.. During the 2008 crisis, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act also provides generous tax provisions to businesses. A common
motivation for such policies is the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. That is,
recessions are viewed as periods when ﬁrms’ access to credit is particularly
tight. A reduction in corporate taxation during downturns may help allevi-
ate ﬁnancial market imperfections by eﬀectively making more internal funds
available. Aggregate investment and output are expected to increase as a
result, mitigating the economic slowdown.
Our goal is to quantify how eﬀective temporary corporate tax cuts are when
ﬁrms are subject to ﬁnancing frictions. We consider temporary tax cuts
funded by public debt, so that only the timing of corporate taxation changes.
We ﬁnd that, on impact, a temporary reduction in corporate taxation in-
creases aggregate investment by 26 cents per dollar of tax stimulus, and
aggregate output by 3.5 cents. As the policy reverses and corporate taxation
eventually increases, the stimulative eﬀect on investment is also partially re-
versed. Over the long-run, the cumulative investment multiplier is just 4.6
cents per dollar of tax stimulus. The stimulative eﬀect on output is instead
very persistent, as the initial buildup of capital increases future cash-ﬂows
and allows ﬁrms to relax ﬁnancial constraints, even long after the period of
the tax cut reversal. We ﬁnd a cumulative output multiplier of 7.2 cents per
dollar of tax stimulus. These are reasonably large multiplier eﬀects. The
main reason why they are not larger is that although we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ex-
pansion of investment and output among the smallest, constrained ﬁrms, this
is to a large extent achieved by crowding out the investment of the largest,
unconstrained ﬁrms.
Among constrained ﬁrms, we do ﬁnd investment multipliers either very close
or equal to one, especially among new entrants. For these ﬁrms, the the
tax cut is entirely channelled to investment, and the policy achieves full
eﬀectiveness. However, the increased aggregate demand for capital puts up-
ward pressure on the interest rate, which discourages investment among the
large, unconstrained ﬁrms. To quantify the crowding out eﬀect, we prevent
the wage and the interest rate from adjusting, and ﬁnd that the multipliers
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could be two and four times larger for investment and output, respectively.
Our approach is to concentrate on a simple general equilibrium model which
integrates a representative household, a government, and a production sec-
tor featuring heterogeneous ﬁrms potentially subject to ﬁnancing frictions.
Firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity and entry/exit shocks, and
we abstract from aggregate uncertainty. The ﬁrm’s optimal investment de-
cisions in response to shocks may require funds from the household sector,
in addition to retained earnings. We assume that there is an upper bound
on the amount of external funds a ﬁrm has access to. The industry equi-
librium features some ﬁrms which are ﬁnancially constrained. The number
of constrained ﬁrms, as well as the extent of investment distortions, are key
for estimating the expansionary eﬀect of the corporate tax cut policy. We
infer these features by requiring the model to match certain properties of
the cross-sectional distribution of cash ﬂow and investment rates across U.S.
establishments.
The literature has mostly considered a diﬀerent justiﬁcation for temporary
corporate tax cuts, which relies on intertemporal substitution. That is, when
the reduction in taxes is temporary, ﬁrms may have an incentive to concen-
trate investment and production activities in the periods of lower taxation.
Related policy interventions may also rely, for instance, on temporary invest-
ment tax credits [Abel, 1982]. These policies have in common their distor-
tionary nature, and therefore their impact on intertemporal marginal costs
and beneﬁts from investing. The literature has provided a number of analysis
of this channel. One example is Dotsey [1994], who considers an environment
where the government is subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and
capital taxes in any given period are stochastic. In this setting, lowering
capital taxes today entails higher expected taxes in the future. This may
actually lower investment today when taxation is distortionary and if the
eﬀect of higher future distortions dominates the ﬁrms’ investment decisions.
Another recent example is Gourio and Miao [2011]. These authors study the
2003 dividend and capital gain tax cuts in the U.S., under the assumption
that they were unexpected and temporary. They conclude that the capi-
tal gain tax cut alone would temporarily increase investment by nearly 10
percent, in accordance with the intertemporal substitution eﬀect. However,
when combined with the dividend tax cut, investment actually declines by
slightly more than 10 percent. The reason is that ﬁrms choose to cut invest-
ment expenditures in order to pay more dividends when the dividend tax is
temporarily low, an eﬀect large enough to overturn the capital gain tax one.
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Gourio and Miao [2011] use a setting which is related to ours, in the sense
that they also rely on a general equilibrium model with ﬁrm heterogeneity.
However, they concentrate on the ﬁrm’s choice of how to fund investment
expenditures (retained earnings, debt, or equity), whereas our focus is on the
presence of an overall external ﬁnancing constraint.
Missing from the literature is precisely an assessment of the role of temporary
tax relief policies in alleviating ﬁnancial frictions. In order to separate this
channel from the intertemporal substitution channel, we assume corporate
taxes are non-distortionary. Our setup satisﬁes a Ricardian proposition, in
the sense that absent ﬁnancial frictions temporary corporate tax cuts produce
no aggregate eﬀects. We start the economy from the stationary equilibrium,
and consider a surprise temporary reduction in corporate tax rates when
ﬁrms are subject to ﬁnancial frictions. Our calibration ensures that the ex-
tent of ﬁnancial frictions allows the model to replicate salient features of
the ﬁrm-level data at steady-state. We solve for the model’s transition back
to the initial steady-state, and compute the investment and output eﬀects
of the policy on impact. Our results show that the expansionary eﬀect of
these policies is reasonably large. These results are consistent with Heath-
cote [2005], who shows that temporary income tax cuts when consumers
(instead of ﬁrms) face borrowing constraints generate increases in aggregate
consumption of 11.4 cents per dollar of lost tax revenue with lump-sum taxes
(like here), and of 29 cents with proportional taxes. Financing constraints
therefore generate signiﬁcant departures from Ricardian equivalence, both
among ﬁrms and among consumers.
2.2 Model
The model consists of a representative household, a continuum of ﬁrms with
a unit mass, and a government. Time is discrete and indexed by t.
2.2.1 Firms
Firms face both idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and idiosyncratic entry
and exit shocks. The current productivity shock, denoted by εt, follows a
Markov chain with transition probabilities π(εt, εt−1) and takes values on the
ﬁnite set E.
The entry and exit shock follows a Bernoulli process. Each incumbent ﬁrm
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faces a per period exit probability of η ∈ (0, 1), following production. In
every period, the total mass η of exiters is replaced by an equal mass of
entrants, each drawn from an homogenous pool of potential entrants. The
total mass of active ﬁrms in every period is normalized to 1.
Our modelling of entry and exit is similar to the existing literature, see for
example Khan and Thomas [2013]. Entry and exit allows for a nontrivial
equilibrium ﬁrm distribution and ensures some ﬁrms will always be ﬁnancially
constrained. We assume a law of large numbers holds so that aggregate
quantities and prices are deterministic for given government policy.



!

!	

 

!

 !
 
	!
	



 	
!

	


Figure 2.1: Timing of the model
Figure 3.1 illustrates the timing of the model according to the type of ﬁrm,
incumbent or prospective entrant. At the beginning of period t, incumbents
draw a productivity shock, and then hire labor, produce, pay corporate taxes,
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invest in physical capital, and pay dividends to their shareholders. An exit
shock is drawn at the end of the period. If an incumbent is to exit, we assume
it sells its capital stock at the beginning of next period, and permanently
leaves the industry.
Potential entrants are ex-ante identical, and they all start with no initial
capital. Upon entering the industry at time t, a new entrant needs to raise
funds and invest in order to begin producing next period. These new entrants
become incumbent ﬁrms at time t+1, and they all begin production activity
with the same initial level of capital.
Firms are owned by the representative consumer, who holds an equity stake
on each of them. In every period ﬁrms pay dividends to the representative
consumer. Firms are neither allowed to issue new equity nor make equity
repurchases. We also assume, without loss of generality, that ﬁrms do not
have access to the bond market, or any other source of external funding.
In our model, ﬁrms may therefore access external funds by paying negative
dividends, while new entrants also raise funds by selling equity. We say
without loss of generality because our main focus is to model the eﬀect of
constraints on the overall extent of external ﬁnancing a ﬁrm may obtain,
irrespective of the source.
2.2.1.1 Incumbent Firm
We formalize the problem of the ﬁrm when government policy follows a de-
terministic path, likewise for aggregate prices. Denote by Vt(kt, εt) the value
of a ﬁrm at time t, with capital stock kt and productivity shock εt. The
Bellman equation is:
Vt(kt, εt) = max
nt,kt+1,dt
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩dt +
1
1 + rt+1
⎡
⎢⎣ ηkt+1 + (1− η)∗∑
εt+1
π(εt+1, εt)Vt+1(kt+1, εt+1)
⎤
⎥⎦
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(2.1)
subject to
yt = dt + wtnt + τt + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (2.2a)
dt ≥ −d¯+ ζkt, (2.2b)
where output is yt = εtf(kt, nt) = εt
(
kt
αn1−αt
)ν , with 0 < α, ν < 1, and
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δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. A decreasing returns to scale technology
ensures that ﬁrm size is always well-deﬁned.
Equation (2.2a) describes the ﬂow of funds condition for the ﬁrm. Output
is the only cash inﬂow, while cash outﬂows include gross investment expen-
ditures, plus tax liabilities, plus wage and dividend payments. Incumbents
cannot issue new equity nor make equity repurchases.
Without any constraint on dividend payments the Modigliani-Miller theorem
holds, and temporary (lump-sum) tax cuts do not aﬀect ﬁrm decisions. Our
departure from the Modigliani-Miller theorem stems from the presence of
(2.2b). This constraint simultaneously captures two types of restrictions on
dividends. First, we impose an upper bound on the access to external funds
−d¯ < 0, which is unconditional on ﬁrm size as measured by the stock of
capital. Second, we also impose a minimum dividend payout requirement,
which is increasing in ﬁrm size for ζ > 0. 1
The ﬁrst restriction is our key friction governing ﬁrms’ access to external
funds. Our second restriction can be justiﬁed by appealing to the notion
that minimum dividend payments may help mitigate agency problems be-
tween shareholders and managers and work as signaling device [see Allen
and Michaely, 2003, for a review]. The fact that they’re increasing with ﬁrm
size is also consistent with evidence that large corporations tend to pay out
a larger fraction of their earnings [Allen and Michaely, 2003]. Bianchi [2013]
adopts a similar dividend payout policy, although we allow it to vary with
ﬁrm size.
Our main motivation for adopting this ﬂexible speciﬁcation is for calibration
purposes. Having ζ > 0 eﬀectively tightens the ﬁnancial constraints faced
by larger ﬁrms. 2 This parameter aﬀords us better control in matching the
average size of entrants relative to the average size of incumbents.
Let λt be the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.2b). The optimality
1. Let −dbt ≥ 0 denote the total amount of borrowing from the household sector. As
explained previously, we assume this borrowing takes the form of negative dividends. Let
dpt ≥ 0 be the total amount of dividend payouts. We impose dbt ≥ −d¯ and dpt ≥ ζkt. Since
we model net dividend payouts dt ≡ dbt + dpt , the overall constraint on this variable is
therefore as in (2.2b). Whenever (2.2b) binds in our model, then dbt = −d¯ and dpt = ζkt.
Otherwise, dt is split arbitrarily between dbt and d
p
t , subject to d
b
t ≥ −d¯ and dpt ≥ ζkt.
2. Financial constraints are still overall tighter for smaller ﬁrms in the model, since
these tend to be farther away from their unconstrained optimal size. See the discussion
surrounding Figure 3.3
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conditions for labor and capital are:
wt = εtf2(kt, nt)
1 + λt =
η
1 + rt+1
+
1− η
1 + rt+1
Et
{
(1 + λt+1)(1− δ + εt+1f1(kt+1, nt+1))
−ζλt+1
}
(2.3)
The discounted marginal gains from investing are on the right-hand-side of
(2.3). When (2.2b) doesn’t bind tomorrow (λt+1 = 0) we obtain the familiar
terms. That is, either the value of undepreciated capital plus the marginal
product if the ﬁrm survives, or the value of investment if the ﬁrm exits.
When λt+1 > 0, and conditional on survival, the discounted value of future
cash ﬂows increases, since they help fund future investment. However, a
larger ﬁrm size tomorrow also tightens the dividend constraint tomorrow
through the dividend payout requirement, which lowers the marginal gain
from investing.
One important point stemming from (2.3) is that corporate taxation, even
if lump-sum, aﬀects the ﬁrm’s investment behavior when the dividend con-
straint (2.2b) binds. This eﬀect is summarized in the value of the multiplier
λt+1 > 0, and obtains by applying the Envelope theorem. If the dividend
constraint is instead slack, then lump-sum corporate taxes do not impact
investment decisions. This sets our paper apart from the related literature
emphasizing the intertemporal substitution eﬀects of tax cuts [Abel, 1982,
Dotsey, 1994, Gourio and Miao, 2011].
2.2.1.2 New Entrant
A new entrant is like an incumbent with a zero capital stock, and no corporate
tax liability. Its main decision is to invest in order to start operating next
period. The investment is fully funded by the sales of equity to the household
sector at price pet , whose amount is normalized to one, net of any dividend
payout det , which we assume can take place within the period of new equity
issuance. This assumption simpliﬁes our formulation of the new entrant’s
ﬁnancing constraint. Denote by V et the value of a new entrant. Then
V et = max
ket+1,d
e
t
{
det +
1
1 + rt+1
∑
εt+1
π¯(εt+1)Vt+1(k
e
t+1, εt+1)
}
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subject to
pet = k
e
t+1 + d
e
t (2.4)
pet − det ≤ d¯, (2.5)
where π¯(εt+1) is the long-run probability of state εt+1, and Vt+1 is the in-
cumbent’s value function deﬁned previously. The initial productivity of new
entrants is therefore drawn from the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain.
Equation (2.4) is the cash-ﬂow constraint of the ﬁrm. We impose a constraint
on the dividend payout of new entrants, equation (2.5), leading to the same
maximal net amount of funds d¯ they can obtain from the household sector as
when they become incumbents. Since new entrants are homogeneous, they
all choose the same initial level of capital. In addition, our parameterization
is such that d¯ is suﬃciently low compared to the unconditional mean of
the productivity shocks, so that new entrants will always ﬁnd themselves
constrained. The solution to their problem is:
det = −d¯+ pet
ket+1 = k
e = d¯.
As pointed out previously, we assume the amount of shares outstanding by
each ﬁrm stays constant throughout their life-cycle at the level issued upon
entry.
2.2.2 Aggregation
Denote the incumbent’s decision rule for investment by kt+1(st), where st ≡
(kt, εt) is the individual state. Let S ≡ K × E denote the set of individual
states, where K is the set of capital stock levels. Let ΩS denote the product
σ − algebra on S with typical subset A.
We can summarize the aggregate distribution of ﬁrms with a measure de-
ﬁned over the state space S, μt(A), which is the mass of ﬁrms engaged in
production at time t, with state st ∈ A ⊆ S. This includes incumbents as of
t − 1 which survive into t, and the new entrants replacing the exiters as of
t− 1.
Now deﬁne the transition function Qt of incumbents across states:
Qt : S × ΩS → [0, 1]
(st, K × E) → Qt(st, K × E) =
∑
εt+1∈E
π(εt+1, εt)1kt+1(st)∈K ,
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where 1K is the indicator function on the set K.
For any Borel set A ∈ ΩS, the law motion of the aggregate state of the
economy is:
μt+1(A) = (1− η)
ˆ
S
Qt(s,A)μt(s)ds+ ηψ(A), (2.6)
where ψ is the distribution of new entrants,
ψ(K × E) =
∑
εt+1∈E
π¯ (εt+1)1ke∈K . (2.7)
It is useful to deﬁne aggregate investment at this point:
it =
ˆ
S
kt+1(s)dμt(s)− (1− δ)
[
(1− η)
ˆ
S
kt(s)dμt−1(s) + ηke
]
+
η
[
ke −
ˆ
S
kt(s)dμt−1(s)
]
, (2.8)
where the ﬁrst two terms correspond to the total gross investment of incum-
bent ﬁrms as of time t (which includes the fraction 1− η of those that were
already operating at t− 1, plus the fraction η of new entrants at t− 1), and
the last term corresponds to the investment of new entrants as of time t, net
of the disinvestment of exiters.
2.2.3 Household
A representative household with unit measure derives utility from consump-
tion alone, according to a standard time-additive utility function u(c) = log c,
with future utility discounted at rate 0 < β < 1. A time endowment of 1 is
supplied inelastically every period.
The household trades equity shares in the ﬁrms, as well as a government
bond. Let θt(s) denote the shareholding of type s ∈ S ﬁrms at the start of
period t (θet for new entrants), valued at price pt(s) (p
e
t for new entrants),
and bt the government bondholding, paying interest rate rt.
Let Wt denote the household’s value function, which solves the Bellman equa-
tion:
Wt(ωt) = max
ct,bt+1,θet+1,{θt+1(s)}s∈S
{log ct + βWt+1(ωt+1)} (2.9)
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subject to
ct + bt+1 + η (p
e
t − det ) θet+1 +
ˆ
S
pt(s)θt+1(s)dμt(s) = ωt (2.10a)
ωt+1 ≡ wt+1 + (1 + rt+1)bt+1 + η
ˆ
S
kt+1(s)θt+1(s)dμt(s)+ˆ
S
[pt+1(s) + dt+1(s)]
[
(1− η)θt+1(s) + ηθet+1
]
dμt+1(s).
(2.10b)
Equation (2.10a) is the household’s budget constraint. The consumer spends
his resources ωt on consumption, government bonds, and equity purchases
of new entrants, net of current dividend payouts, plus equity purchases of
incumbents at time t. Income from (2.10b) equals labor earnings, plus the
income from government bondholdings, plus the income from physical cap-
ital sales of exiting ﬁrms, plus shareholding income. The latter equals the
dividend plus share value of new entrants at time t and surviving incumbents
from t to t+ 1.
The sole outcome from the household’s problem which is relevant for our
analysis is the real interest rate determination. From the ﬁrst-order condition
for government bonds
ct+1
ct
= β(1 + rt+1),
and in steady-state we obtain 1 = β(1 + r).
2.2.4 Government
Government spends a constant amount of resources g > 0 at each time
t, funded either by lump sum corporate taxation, providing total revenue
equal to τt, or by issuing one period debt bt+1, held by the representative
consumer. 3 The government’s budget constraint is
(1 + rt)bt + g = τt + bt+1,
together with the no Ponzi game condition:
lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
(1 + rt)
−1bT+1 ≤ 0.
3. We also assume g is small enough relative to average productivity, so that government
spending does not necessarily exhaust aggregate production.
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Requiring that the government wastes no resources and therefore satisﬁes the
no Ponzi game condition with equality, we obtain the present value budget
constraint:
b0 + g
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + ri)
−1 =
∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + ri)
−1τt, (2.11)
where we assume b0 = 0.
The government’s policy will be a sequence {τt, bt+1}∞t=0 of tax rates and debt
issuance which satisﬁes (2.11).
2.2.5 Stationary Equilibrium
We now provide a formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium, focusing on the steady-
state. Given a stationary government policy (τt, bt+1) = (τ, b), a stationary
recursive competitive equilibrium is a value function V (st), with st ≡ (kt, εt),
and a set of decision rules for incumbents, n(st), k(st), y(st) and d(st), a value
function V e and a decision rule for new entrants ke, a value function W and
a set of decisions for the representative household c, b, θe and {θ(st)}st∈S,
time-invariant cross-sectional distributions of new entrants and incumbents,
respectively μ and ψ, and prices r, w, {p(st)}st∈S and pe such that:
1. Given prices, each agent’s value function and decision rules solve their
corresponding problem.
2. Given prices, the government’s policy satisﬁes the present value bud-
get constraint (2.11).
3. Markets clear:
— Labor market:
ˆ
S
n(s)dμ(s) = 1.
— Equity market:
new entrants: θe = 1.
incumbents: θ(s) = 1, for all s ∈ S.
— Final good:
ˆ
S
y(s)dμ(s) = i+ c+ g, where i is deﬁned in (2.8).
4. μ is the ﬁxed point of (3.9), and ψ is deﬁned in (2.7).
2.3 Model Solution
We solve our model by numerical methods. The algorithm consists of two
parts. First, we compute the steady-state, which characterizes the economy
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both before and in the long-run following the tax cut. This requires ﬁrst
solving for the industry equilibrium given wages (the real interest rate is
pinned-down by β), and then computing wages to clear the labor market. As
part of the solution, we obtain aggregate consumption from the economy’s
resource constraint, with aggregate production and investment being the
outcome of the industry equilibrium.
Second, for the transition of the economy following the transitory tax cut,
we use a backward induction algorithm. We guess a transition length and a
sequence of wages and real interest rates along the transition, and solve for
the industry equilibrium and household consumption at each point in time.
We then ensure that prices clear the labor and the ﬁnal good markets at each
point along the transition. The details of the numerical algorithm are in the
Appendix.
2.4 Calibration
The steady-state of the model is calibrated to U.S. data for establishment-
level investment dynamics. 4 This data is reported annually, thus one model
period corresponds to one calendar year. Our parameters can be classiﬁed
into two groups. The ﬁrst group includes parameters we set a priori and are
reported in Table 3.1. The return to scale parameter ν = 0.85 has a standard
Table 2.1: Parameters selected a priori
Parameter Value Source
Return to scale υ 0.85 Atkeson and Kehoe [2005] and others
Capital elasticity α 1/3 income share data
Discount factor β 0.96 interest rate of 4%
Exit probability η 0.05 Evans [1987], Lee and Mukoyama [2012]
value in the literature employing the same production function speciﬁcation
as ours [Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008, Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005, Pavcnik,
2002, Veracierto, 2001, Atkenson et al., 1996, Gomes, 2001, Clementi and
4. Although we calibrate our model to establishment-level data, we still refer to pro-
duction units in our model as ﬁrms.
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Palazzo, 2013], as is the capital share parameter α = 1/3. 5 An annual exit
rate of 5% is in the middle range of the estimates provided by Evans [1987]
and Lee and Mukoyama [2012].
The parameters calibrated internally, by requiring the model to match a set
of moments, are presented in Table 3.2. The corporate tax in the model
delivers a value for the share of corporate tax revenue of GDP as in the data.
From IRS (Internal Revenue Service) data, capital gains and dividend taxes
represent roughly 1% of GDP on average for the 2000-2005 period. Taxes
on S corporations (whose income is taxed at the shareholder rather than at
the corporation level) account for around 1% of GDP over the 2004-2007
period. Corporate proﬁts taxes represent about 2% of GDP on average over
the 2000-2007 period. We therefore target a value of 4%.
Table 2.2: Internal calibration
Parameter Value Target Data Model
Tax rate, gov spending τ, g 0.057 Corp tax revenue 0.040 0.041
to GDP
Depreciation rate δ 0.069 avg(i)/avg(k) 0.069 0.069
Productivity
γ 0.531 sd (i/k) 0.337 0.300
σ 0.253 avg (i/k) 0.122 0.151
ρ 0.618 sd (cf/k) 0.161 0.152
Borrowing limit d¯ 1.574 avg(cf)/avg(k) 0.102 0.127
ζ 0.382 Rel size entrants 0.600 0.585
The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to deliver an aggregate investment-to-
capital ratio of 0.069. This is the same value targetted by Khan and Thomas
[2013], and is based on private capital stock estimates from the Fixed Asset
Tables, controlling for growth, for the 1954-2002 period.
Firm level productivity follows an AR(1) process:
ln εt = (1− ρ)γ + ρ ln εt−1 + σςt, (2.12)
5. In order to arrive at a 1/3 capital share in our model, we assume that the proﬁts
ﬁrms generate after incurring investment expenditures and making payments to labor are
attributed to capital and labor according to the shares α and 1− α.
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where ςt follows an i.i.d. standard normal distribution. For solving the model,
this process is discretized into a 5-state Markov chain using Tauchen’s (1986)
procedure. The three parameters of the AR(1) process are selected to match
three cross-sectional moments: (i) a standard deviation of investment rates
as a fraction of capital of 0.337, and (ii) an average investment rate of 0.122,
both as reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger [2006], (iii) a standard deviation
of the cash to assets ratio of 0.161, as reported by Khan and Thomas [2013]
using Compustat data for the 1954-2011 period.
The parameters governing the extent of ﬁnancial frictions are key. We infer
them by requiring that the model matches two additional moments relating
to the plant-level dynamics: (i) an average employment size of new entrants
(ﬁrms in their ﬁrst production year) of 60% of the average size of incumbents,
as reported by Lee and Mukoyama [2012] using data from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) for the 1972-1997 period;
(ii) an aggregate cash-to-asset ratio of 0.102, as reported Khan and Thomas
[2013] for Compustat data.
Our calibration implies d¯ > 0 and ζ > 0. As pointed out previously, this
implies binding borrowing constraints, which are overall tighter for smaller
ﬁrms. To illustrate this point, Figure 3.3 plots the ratio of actual to uncon-
strained investment levels in the model as a function of current capital (ﬁrm
size). 6 Two lines are plotted, one for a high and the other for a low value of
current (hence expected future) productivity. A value of one means the ﬁrm
is operating at the unconstrained level, and the lower the ratio the tighter
the borrowing constraint is. The parameter ζ allows us to control how fast
this ratio increases with ﬁrm size. As the ﬁgure illustrates, the magnitude
we obtain for ζ is still consistent with smaller ﬁrms, which generate less cash
ﬂows, being the most constrained. See Beck et al. [2005] and Angelini and
Generale [2008] for some evidence consistent with this model prediction.
The ﬁgure also shows that high productivity ﬁrms are more constrained,
given their higher unconstrained optimal level of investment. Our calibration,
namely the degree of persistence of the productivity shocks, is such that this
eﬀect always dominates the eﬀect of higher current cash-ﬂows due to higher
current productivity.
6. The unconstrained investment level k∗t+1 is the solution to either the new entrant or
the incumbent’s problem when ignoring the dividend constraint.
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Figure 2.2: Tightness of the Dividend Constraint
2.5 Steady-State Properties
2.5.1 Firm Size Distribution
Figure 2.3 plots the ﬁrm size distribution that obtains in the stationary equi-
librium, when size is measured by either employment or capital. Figure 2.3a
displays a right-skewed employment distribution which resembles its empir-
ical counterpart in the U.S. [Hsieh and Klenow, 2014, Henly and Sanchez,
2009].
Since capital is predetermined whereas employment is not, some of the model’s
properties are more transparent when looking at the capital distribution in
Figure 2.3b. We identify several ﬁrm types. Startups, deﬁned as ﬁrms in their
ﬁrst year of productive activity, are among the smallest ﬁrms in the econ-
omy, and are mostly borrowing-constrained. The remaining ﬁrms, widely
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distributed across diﬀerent sizes, are what we label mature incumbents. The
fraction of constrained mature incumbents does not decline with ﬁrm size,
and the reason is that larger ﬁrms also tend to have higher expected produc-
tivity, hence they are also more likely to be constrained (recall also Figure
3.3).
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
(a) Employment (relative to unconditional
mean)
0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Mature−Unconstrained
Mature−Constrained
Startup−Unconstrained
Startup−Constrained
(b) Capital (relative to unconditional mean)
Figure 2.3: Stationary Firm Size Distribution
Table 2.3 provides further information about the steady-state distribution
of ﬁrms. Startups are only 5 percent of the total number of ﬁrms, given
by the exogenous entry probability, and since they tend to be constrained
and small, they contribute to an even lower percentage of about 3 percent of
aggregate output. Most of aggregate output is therefore produced by mature
incumbents. An important feature is that although constrained ﬁrms are
only about half of all mature incumbents, they contribute to almost 2/3 of
total output. This is again explained by the fact that these ﬁrms tend to be
very productive in the model.
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Table 2.3: Relative Importance of Startups and Mature Incumbents
Share of total (in %)
ﬁrms capital output
Startups 5 2.3 3
constrained 3.4 1.6 2.5
unconstrained 1.6 0.7 0.5
Mature 95 97.7 97
constrained 46.9 47.8 63.7
unconstrained 48.1 49.9 33.3
2.5.2 Firm Dynamics
Table 3.3 reports the job creation and job destruction rates in the stationary
equilibrium and in the data [Lee and Mukoyama, 2012]. The job creation
rate is deﬁned in the usual way, as the total employment change among
expanding ﬁrms, relative to the initial employment size across all ﬁrms. 7
The job destruction rate is deﬁned in an analogous way for shrinking ﬁrms.
Table 2.4: Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates
Job Creation Job Destruction
Model Data Model Data
20.7 9 20.7 10
Relative Contribution
startups 14 17 0 0
mature 86 83 76 76
exiters 0 0 24 24
The table shows that, in the aggregate, the job creation and destruction
rates in the model are twice as high compared to the data. This is in part
due to the way we model entry (initial productivity drawn from the uncon-
ditional distribution, rather than from a distribution with lower mean) and
7. In the empirical counterpart, initial employment size is deﬁned as (nt + nt−1)/2,
where nt is aggregate employment at time t. In our model, nt = 1 for all t.
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exit (random across all incumbents, rather higher among smaller ﬁrms).
The relative contribution of the diﬀerent ﬁrm types, however, is totally in
line with the data, in spite of this not being a calibration target. Mature
incumbents are responsible for most job creation and destruction in the econ-
omy.
Figure 3.4b plots average employment growth conditional on ﬁrm employ-
ment. Our model’s implications are consistent with the empirical evidence
that ﬁrm growth is unconditionally negatively correlated with size as reported
by Dunne et al. [1988]. Models along the lines of Hopenhayn’s (1992), such
as ours, deliver this implication due in large measure to the mean-reverting
nature of the stochastic process for productivity.
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Figure 2.4: Average Employment Growth Conditional on Size
In our speciﬁc case, the presence of capital as a production input subject to
ﬁnancial constraints provides additional mechanisms both contributing and
going against the overall pattern in Figure 3.4b. Smaller ﬁrms in our model
not only have higher expected future productivity, some of them are also
ﬁnancially constrained and hence have a relatively low current level of capital.
These ﬁrms tend to grow fast as they catch up to their unconstrained-optimal
level of capital. On the other hand, larger ﬁrms subject to low productivity
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shocks are unable to adjust their current level of capital instantly, hence they
tend to reduce their employment level by less than what their productivity
alone would imply. These features are shared by other models with pre-
determined capital and either ﬁnancial frictions or adjustment costs to capital
[e.g Khan and Thomas, 2013, Clementi and Palazzo, 2013].
2.6 Temporary Corporate Tax Cut
To quantitatively assess the eﬀects of temporary cuts in corporate taxes, we
undertake the following experiment. We assume that, in period 0, the econ-
omy is in steady-state with τ0 = g and b0 = 0. In period 1, the government
unexpectedly announces the following policy change. In period 1, corporate
taxes are cut down to zero, τ1 = 0. Since the amount of government spending
is held constant and no other forms of taxation are available, the tax cut is
absorbed by an increase in public debt in period 1, b1 = g. In period 2,
the government increases corporate taxes, by an amount suﬃcient to cover
not only the period 2 spending, but also the full servicing of the outstanding
debt, τ2 = (2 + r2)g and b2 = 0. This allows the government to revert back
to its initial policy of funding government spending totally out of corporate
taxes, with zero public debt issuance. The top panel in Figure 2.5 displays
the dynamics of corporate taxes associated with this policy.
We assume that, in period 1, agents in our model have full information about
the new government policy, and perfect foresight about its future eﬀect on
prices. Although the policy itself reverts back to its initial state after period
2, the price eﬀects are long-lived, as the economy slowly transitions back to its
initial steady-state. Appendix B.2 provides some details on the computation
of the economy’s transition.
2.6.1 Transitional Dynamics
Figure 2.5 plots the tax policy, as well as the transitional dynamics of invest-
ment and output. In period 0, the economy is in the steady-state. After 10
periods following the tax cut, the economy approximately converges back to
the initial steady-state. In period 1, since capital is predetermined, there are
no aggregate output eﬀects. Aggregate investment, however, increases on im-
pact, namely due to the response of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. In period
2, as the tax rate increases signiﬁcantly, overshooting its steady-state level,
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aggregate investment decreases. This decreasing in aggregate investment is
relatively small, however it persists while the economy gradually converges
back to its initial steady-state. These dynamics of aggregate investment im-
ply that output increases signiﬁcantly in period 2. This stimulative eﬀect is
long-lasting, with the initial investment build-up being the dominant force
keeping the aggregate capital stock above its steady-state level all along the
transition.
The asymmetric response of aggregate investment to initial tax cut and sub-
sequent tax increase is a key point of our analysis, leading to persistent
expansionary eﬀects out of a purely transitory policy change. The initial tax
cut allows ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms to expand their productive capacity,
resulting in a large aggregate investment eﬀect. This initial capital build-up
allows ﬁrms to generate larger cash-ﬂows in the subsequent periods. Some of
these ﬁrms are therefore able to either escape, or at least mitigate, the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial constraints, resulting in higher investment levels. This eﬀect is
long-lasting because it takes time to erode the eﬀect of the higher initial cap-
ital, requiring a suﬃcient number of negative productivity and exit shocks
for cash-ﬂows to return to their initial levels, and ﬁnancial constraints to be
as binding.
Figure 2.6 shows the response of the interest rate, wages, and aggregate
consumption and the net ﬁrm payout to the household sector. The latter is
deﬁned as the sum of net dividend payouts by incumbents (
ˆ
dt(s)dμt(s)),
plus the dividend payouts net of the spending on new equity issuance by new
entrants (det − ηpet ). Its negative corresponds to the net amount that ﬁrms
borrow from the household sector.
As ﬁrms increase labor demand from period 2 onwards, and given our in-
elastic aggregate labor supply, wages are higher along the transition. Wages
decline monotonically toward the steady-state, alongside labor demand. The
real interest rate parallels the dynamics of aggregate investment, increas-
ing initially and then decreasing, and ﬁnally converging back to its initial
steady-state from below.
The net ﬁrm payout increases initially, as only some incumbent ﬁrms rely
on the additional cash-ﬂows generated by the corporate tax cut in order to
increase investment, whereas others simply transfer it back to consumers
in the form of higher dividends. In period 2, the net ﬁrm payout collapses
signiﬁcantly, given the sharp increase in corporate taxes and the need to keep
funding investment and make payments to labor.
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Figure 2.5: Transitional Dynamics of Aggregate Invest-
ment and Output
Aggregate consumption is the mirror image of the net ﬁrm payout. It declines
in period 1, in spite of an increase in net ﬁrm payout. The latter, however, is
less than the full amount of the corporate tax decline, as some ﬁrms invest out
of this windfall, and there is no change in production. The household must
therefore be enticed to save more, via a higher interest rate, to purchase the
government debt necessary to ﬁnance the level of government expenditure.
Consumption increases in period 2, since again the net ﬁrm payout varies by
less than the amount of period 2’s tax increase, as ﬁrms rely partially on the
higher retained earnings aﬀorded by the increased production. The supply
of government bonds, however goes back to zero, and a lower interest rate is
needed to encourage the household to actually increase consumption.
It is useful to consider the situation in which ﬁnancial frictions are absent.
In this case, the full amount of the corporate tax decline is transferred to the
household in the form of higher dividends, and there is no impact on produc-
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Figure 2.6: Prices, Net Firm Payout, and Consumption
tion. The household behaves just like in the standard Ricardian Equivalence
result. Rather than changing (in this case increasing) consumption, the con-
sumer opts to save all the extra income. The real interest rate remains
unchanged. This saving serves to pay for the future anticipated decline in
dividends, which will occur as ﬁrms seek resources to cover the corporate tax
increase.
Figure 2.7 shows how the incumbent’s decision rules for investment and the
net ﬁrm payout (just dividends in this case) change as a result of the cut in
corporate taxes. The ﬁgure plots the decision rules in period 1 under two
scenarios, the benchmark steady-state and the tax cut policy. All decision
rules are conditional on the same level of productivity. Notice that the tax
cut produces a direct eﬀect on the decision rules, by increasing cash ﬂows,
and an indirect general equilibrium eﬀect by increasing the wage rate and
the interest rate.
In both panels, the kink occurs at the level of capital beyond which the ﬁrm
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Figure 2.7: Decision Rules in Period 1
ceases to be constrained. Figure 2.7a shows that the impact of the tax cut
is to relax the ﬁnancial constraint, in the sense that the kink moves to the
left, and also in the sense that investment is higher in the constrained region.
The same ﬁgure also reveals that the tax cut produces the opposite eﬀect
for unconstrained incumbents. For them the investment is lower, due to
both a higher wage rate (higher production costs) and a higher interest rate
(heavier discounting of future dividends). The tax cut therefore crowds-out
the investment among the larger, unconstrained ﬁrms.
Figure 2.7b provides a consistent message. Dividend payouts remain un-
changed for ﬁrms that remain constrained, as the full amount of the tax
windfall is used to fund investment. For unconstrained incumbents, however,
dividend payouts increase, as ﬁrms pass the corporate tax cut to consumers,
given that their investments needs are met with their level of retained earn-
ings.
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2.6.2 Corporate Tax Cut Multipliers
To quantify the stimulative eﬀects of the transitory corporate tax cut, we
compute the associated aggregate output and investment tax cut multipliers.
We are interested in comparing aggregate output and investment along the
transition relative to the steady-state. We also look at the behavior of the net
ﬁrm payout, in order to better understand the behavior of external funding
from the household sector.
More speciﬁcally, let {xt}∞t=1 denote the transition path for either aggregate
output, aggregate investment, or the net ﬁrm payout, following period 1’s
tax cut. Let x¯ be the steady-state value, and deﬁne the change relative
to steady state as Δxt ≡ xt − x¯. Similarly, the extent of the tax cut is
Δτ1 ≡ − (τ1 − g) = g. We compute two types of multiplier:
1. Impact Multiplier: mit(x) ≡ Δxtτ1 , for t = 1, 2.
2. Cumulative Multiplier: mc(x) ≡ 1 + r1τ1
∞∑
t=1
Δxt
t∏
i=1
(1 + ri)
.
Given the diﬀerent timing of the impact responses of aggregate output and
investment seen in Figure 2.6, we compute the impact multipliers mi1(i) and
mi1(np) for aggregate investment and net ﬁrm payout, respectively, and the
impact multiplier mi2(y) for aggregate output. For the cumulative multi-
pliers, we compute mc(i), mc(np) and mc(y) for aggregate investment, net
ﬁrm payout, and output, respectively. The model’s equilibrium interest rate
sequence along the transition is used to discount future changes back to pe-
riod 1. Based upon our results, the cumulative multiplier computed over a
ten-year long transition provides a good approximation to the one computed
over the whole transition.
Table 2.5 reports the responses of aggregate and ﬁrm-level investment, out-
put, and net ﬁrm payout. The top panel reveals that per dollar of tax
stimulus, these variables increase on impact by 25.7, 74.3, and 3.5 cents,
respectively.
Compared with the impact multipliers, the cumulative multipliers are sub-
stantially lower for investment and the net ﬁrm payout. In particular, the
cumulative investment eﬀect is only about one quarter of the impact ef-
fect. The net ﬁrm payout increases only by 1 cent over the long run, while
it increases by more 70 cents instantaneously with the tax cut. For out-
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put, instead, the cumulative multiplier is about twice as high as the impact
multiplier since, as explained previously, the temporary tax cut generates a
long-lasting stimulative production eﬀect.
Table 2.5: Corporate Tax Cut Multipliers (cents per dollar of tax stimulus)
Investment Output Net Firm Payout
Aggregate
impact 25.7 3.5 74.3
cumulative 4.6 7.2 1
Firm-level, impact
Startups 68.1 15.9 31.9
constrained 100 24.8 0
unconstrained -0.02 -3.0 100.02
Mature 23.4 2.2 76.6
constrained 82.4 16.5 17.6
unconstrained -34.1 -11.8 134.1
The bottom panel of Table 2.5 reports the impact multipliers conditional
on speciﬁc ﬁrm-types. For startups, the investment multiplier is of 68 cents
per dollar of tax revenue, whereas the remaining 32 cents are paid out as
dividends. The stimulative eﬀect on output is of 16 cents. These multipliers
are naturally higher for constrained startups. For these, the full amount of
the tax reduction is channeled to investment, with no additional dividend
payouts. As a result, the output eﬀect is also maximized with an impact
multiplier of about 25 cents. The opposite happens for the relatively fewer
number of unconstrained startups, who channel the entirety of the additional
cash-ﬂows to dividend payouts. Their investment and output end up declin-
ing in the end, given that prices increase on impact.
The response of mature incumbents is qualitatively similar, although the
multipliers are of lower magnitude overall. In particular, the stimulative ef-
fect on investment is only about 23 cents, whereas on output is only 2 cents
per dollar of tax revenue. For constrained mature incumbents the multipliers
are higher, without reaching the same level as the startups. The decline in
corporate taxes is suﬃcient to allow some of these ﬁrms to become uncon-
strained, and hence transfer some of this tax decline back to consumers in the
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form of higher dividends. The unconstrained mature incumbents, instead,
face negative growth, as they face higher prices without any productive use
for the higher cash ﬂows.
2.6.3 Quantifying the Crowding-Out Eﬀect
We have shown how the tax cut crowds out investment among larger, un-
constrained ﬁrms due to higher prices. To quantify the dampening eﬀect of
general equilibrium price movements, we now perform a partial equilibrium
analysis, by implementing the temporary tax cut while ﬁxing the wage rate
and the interest rate at their steady-state levels.
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Figure 2.8: Transitional Dynamics, benchmark (solid) vs
partial equilibrium (dashed)
Figure 2.6 compares the transition dynamics with and without the price ad-
justment. To facilitate the comparison, all variables are reported in percent-
age deviation from their steady-state values. As anticipated, the investment,
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output, and consumption eﬀects are stronger in partial equilibrium, whereas
the net ﬁrm payout is weaker.
Table 2.6: Partial Equilibrium Multipliers (cents per dollar of tax stimulus)
Investment Output Net Firm Payout
Aggregate
impact multiplier 47.6 13.6 52.4
cumulative multiplier 9.4 25.2 5.9
Firm-level impact multiplier
Startups 68.1 20.0 31.9
constrained 100 29.3 0
unconstrained 0 0 100
Mature 46.5 12.6 53.6
constrained 94.1 25.4 5.9
unconstrained 0 0 100
Table 2.6 gives a sense of the magnitudes, by computing the same multipliers
as in Table 2.5. Comparing the two tables shows that both the impact and
the cumulative multipliers are signiﬁcantly larger in partial equilibrium, not
only in the aggregate, but also conditional on ﬁrm types. The impact eﬀect
is around two times larger for investment and four times larger for output.
The reason is once again that the partial equilibrium exercise eliminates
the crowding-out eﬀect among unconstrained ﬁrms. Further, there is also
an additional positive eﬀect among constrained ﬁrms, as they are able to
channel some of the lower wage level into further investment.
2.7 Conclusion
We have assessed the eﬀectiveness of temporary reductions in corporate taxes
in raising aggregate investment and output. The mechanism we have focused
upon relies on the presence of ﬁnancing constraints. Temporary tax relief
for ﬁrms raises investment because credit constrains induce high marginal
propensities to invest. Our analysis has traced out the full transition follow-
ing the tax cut, using a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. Our main ﬁnding
is that this policy is reasonably eﬀective at raising investment. The eﬀect on
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impact is an increase in investment by 26 cents per dollar of tax stimulus,
and an increase in aggregate output by 3.5 cents. The cumulative eﬀects are
increases in investment and output of 4.6 and 7.2 cents, respectively.
There are several ways in which our analysis could be improved. One would
ideally study the policy experiment in an environment with aggregate uncer-
tainty, and cyclical variation in the severity of ﬁnancing frictions. It would
also be interesting to endogeneize entry and exit decisions, given that tempo-
rary changes in corporate taxation could have potentially important eﬀects
along these margins. Finally, the model could be very easily amended to
feature distortionary taxation, which would allow us to incorporate the in-
tertemporal substitution eﬀects typically considered in the literature into our
analysis.
Chapter 3
Reforming Corporate Taxation:
Eﬀects of A Comprehensive
Business Income Tax
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3.1 Introduction
The US tax code stipulates taxation of capital income at the ﬁrm level and
at the household level. In fact, dividends are paid out of corporate proﬁt net
of corporate income tax and are further taxed when distributed to sharehold-
ers. Similarly, retained earnings are taxed twice to the extent that they are
capitalized in higher share values and are subject to capital gain tax when
realized. In public economics, this double taxation of corporate income is
recognized 1 to reduce the overall return on investment and the eﬃciency of
capital allocation. For instance, by taxing corporate equity income twice, the
classical corporate tax system distorts the allocation of resources by discour-
aging the use of the corporate form. This double taxation also encourages
debt ﬁnancing, as interest on corporate bonds are not subject to corporate
taxes. In addition, the current tax system relies on the realization princi-
ple to measure capital gains, while corporate-level tax occurs when income
is earned and the investor-level tax is postponed until the corporation dis-
tributes dividends. Accordingly, the U.S. tax code distorts the timing of ﬁ-
nancial decisions because it encourages investors to engage in tax-motivated
stock trading strategies. For example, Ivkovic et al. [2005] present evidence
of trading behavior that is consistent with year-end tax-loss selling. Further-
more, corporate earnings distribution through dividend is much taxed than
through capital gain generated by reinvested earnings. These tax asymme-
tries may lead to lock-in eﬀects for asset with capital gains and impair the
eﬃciency of capital markets. Tax reforms have therefore been at the center
of numerous debates, intended to ﬁnd ways to reduce or remove these dis-
tortions, among economists and policymakers. As part of this debate, the
U.S. Treasury Department studied in 1992 four alternative approaches to
integrate the individual and corporate tax systems. 2 According to the impu-
tation credit prototype, corporations determine their income for tax purposes
as in the existing tax system and pay a corporate-level tax. Shareholders in-
clude in their income the amount of dividend they receive and the associated
tax paid at the corporate level. They apply toward individual tax payments
a credit equal to the amount of corporate tax that would be associated with
gross dividends, (Hubbard [1993]). But the Treasury recommended against
1. For example Fullerton et al. [1981] measures the eﬃciency cost of double corporate
income taxation.
2. McNulty [1994] present further details on almost all the proposals of tax integration
in U.S..
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this form of integration. Under the shareholder allocation model, corpo-
rate earnings would be allocated to shareholders, and the allocated earnings
would be taxable to shareholders even though not distributed to them. The
Treasury Department recommended against this allocation approach as well.
Under the third model, dividend-exclusion prototype, corporates should con-
tinue to pay the usual corporate income tax as in the existing tax system
but dividends would be excluded from the taxable income of shareholders.
The Treasury Department suggested that this reform could serve as a tran-
sition to a most comprehensive reform, the Comprehensive Business Income
Tax (CBIT). Under the CBIT reform, a schedular or ﬂat tax rate would be
collected at the entity level on the earnings of all businesses, non-corporate
and corporate. Most importantly, the CBIT proposal denies deductions for
payments to debt-holders and to equity-holders. In addition, both inter-
est and equity distributions generally would be excludable from income by
investors. 3 The treasury Department considered the CBIT reform as a long-
run tax reform and suggested that it may be brought into eﬀect by a series of
phases. Accordingly, the CBIT reform is the appropriate prototype to focus
on because my interest is in the long run eﬀects of corporate tax reform. In
addition, the CBIT would eliminate tax distortions in organizational form,
capital structure, and dividend policy more completely than any of the other
prototypes. More precisely, the CBIT reform is intended to eliminate three
distortions from the current tax system. First, it removes the distinction
between corporate and non-corporate businesses, and place all business orga-
nizations under the same tax regime. Second, it removes the tax diﬀerentials
between dividends and capital gains by abolishing the second level of tax.
Third, it equalizes debt and equity as sources of ﬁnancing. Hence, corpo-
rate earnings would be taxable once, to the entity, at a single rate, whether
distributed or not, and whether distributed as dividends or interests.
This paper assesses the eﬀects of a prototype CBIT reform on capital for-
mation, output, welfare and allocational eﬃciency when ﬁrms are subject to
ﬁnancing frictions. I ﬁnd that the elimination of dividend and capital gain
taxes is not self-ﬁnancing. More precisely, the results show that the corpo-
rate proﬁt tax rate should be adjusted from 34% to 42% to keep the reform
revenue-neutral. Overall, the CBIT reform results in a decrease in long run
aggregate capital stock and output by 8% and 1%, respectively. However, it
has a positive reallocation eﬀect that raises aggregate productivity by 1.41%
3. See Gentry and Hubbard [1998] for further details on the CBIT proposal.
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and welfare by 0.05%. In addition, capital allocation eﬃciency measured
by the correlation between capital and productivity increases by 20%. Two
forces may explain these ﬁndings. First, the elimination of taxes on both
capital gain and dividend raises the after-tax return on ﬁrms’ shares and
provides a boost to aggregate capital, output, ﬁrm value and wage. Second,
the increase in corporate proﬁt tax reduces after-tax return on investment.
This second force counterbalances the positive eﬀects of zero capital gain and
dividend tax rates on investment. Another mechanism explains the eﬃciency
and welfare gains. In fact, the elimination of the tax wedge makes external
equity and retained earnings perfect substitutes as sources of funds. Thus,
relatively small and highly productivity ﬁrms tap into the equity market to
ﬁnance investment. In addition, the reform removes the deferral advantage
given to retained earnings and eliminates incentives for larger ﬁrms to rein-
vest in projects with below-market yield. Together, the two eﬀects improve
the eﬃciency of capital accumulation. This positive reallocation eﬀect is
strengthened by the increase in the rate of corporate proﬁt tax. In fact, by
reducing the return on investment, higher corporate proﬁt tax rate discour-
ages investment among larger and cash-rich ﬁrms. Lower aggregate capital
demand causes labor demand to decrease and put downward pression on
wage. But, the decline in wage increases the current disposable income of
equity-constrained ﬁrms. These ﬁrms increase investment because they have
higher marginal productivity of capital and unused investment opportunities.
This reallocation improves the eﬃciency of capital allocation. As a result,
aggregate output decreases less than proportional to the decline in aggregate
investment, leading to a modest welfare gains.
My approach considers an industry equilibrium model which integrates a
representative household, a government, and a production sector featuring
heterogeneous ﬁrms potentially subject to ﬁnancing frictions, and to idiosyn-
cratic productivity and entry/exit shocks. However, there is no aggregate
uncertainty. Firms’ optimal investment decisions in response to shocks may
require external ﬁnancing, in addition to retained earnings. But, I assume
there is an upper bound on the amount of external funds a ﬁrm has access to.
In addition, there is an equity constraint that imposes a minimum dividend
payment to shareholders at each period. The ﬁrm heterogeneity along with
the ﬁnancial frictions play a key role in my analysis. At any period of time,
a ﬁrm may ﬁnd itself in four diﬀerent ﬁnancing regimes depending on its
productivity shock and its capital stock. In the equity-constrained regime,
the ﬁrm’s investment is limited by its current cash ﬂows plus the maximum
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amounts of equity it can issue minus the minimum dividend payments. In
the cash-constrained regime, dividend payments are reduced to the minimum
value admissible. External equity remains the marginal ﬁnancing source, but
the ﬁrm is able to fund all proﬁtable investments. In the internal-growth
regime, the dividend constraint remains binding but the marginal source of
investment ﬁnance is retained earnings. Finally, in the cash-rich regime, the
ﬁrm is large enough that it generates suﬃcient cash-ﬂows to fund invest-
ment. In addition, it distributes larger dividends than the minimum payout
requirement. The ﬁrm’s response to corporate tax reform depends on which
ﬁnancing regime the ﬁrm is in before the reform and the extent to which its
investment is distorted.
Fullerton et al. [1981] estimate eﬃciency gains from diﬀerent integration plans
of personal and corporate taxes. However they do not incorporate an explicit
theory of individual ﬁrm behavior. Nadeau and Strauss [1993] also study the
eﬀects of a decrease in shareholder dividend tax rates compensated by an
increase in corporate income tax rates in U.S.. They ﬁnd that the policy in-
creases dividend payments and investment in a partial equilibrium analysis.
In a general equilibrium analysis, Guner et al. [2012] evaluate revenue-neutral
reforms to the U.S. tax system in a life-cycle setup but they focus on house-
hold heterogeneity and the eﬀects on labor supply. Gourio and Miao [2010]
and Atesagaoglu et al. [2014] analyze the implications of a revenue neutral
tax reform that reduces and equalizes dividend and capital gain taxes at the
expense of higher labor income tax. Atesagaoglu et al. [2014] incorporate
both ﬁrm and household heterogeneity and ﬁnd that the reform leads to a
decrease in the capital stock, but an increase in output because capital is
more eﬃciently allocated across ﬁrms. Gourio and Miao [2010] use a setting
which is more related to mine, in the sense that they also rely on a general
equilibrium model with only ﬁrm heterogeneity, but they do not consider an
overall external ﬁnancing constraint as in this paper. They ﬁnd that aggre-
gate capital, output and consumption increase. In contrast to Gourio and
Miao [2010] and Atesagaoglu et al. [2014], I use the corporate proﬁt tax,
instead of labor income tax, to compensate the reduction in tax revenue.
Missing from the literature is precisely the assessment of the long run eﬀects
of a tax reform that completely eliminates the capital gain and dividend
taxes, and compensates the government revenue lost by an increase in the
corporate proﬁt tax rate. This is the prototype of the 1992’s proposal of
the U.S. Treasury Department. The results show that the reform leads to
a reduction in aggregate capital stock and output 8% and 1%, respectively
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in the long run. However, the policy improves capital allocation by 20%,
resulting in an increase in aggregate productivity by 1.41% and in a modest
welfare gain.
3.2 Model
The model consists of a representative household, a continuum of ﬁrms with
a unit mass, and a government. There is no aggregate uncertainty. Time is
discrete and is indexed by t.
3.2.1 Firms
Firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In addition to idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, I also assume that ﬁrms receive exogenous entry and
exit shocks. In particular, each ﬁrm faces a per period exit probability of
η ∈ (0, 1), following production. In every period, this mass of exiters is
replaced by an equal mass of entrants. This assumption is entertained by
several papers, more recently by Khan and Thomas [2013]. Entry and exit
allows for a nontrivial equilibrium ﬁrm distribution and ensures some ﬁrms
will always be ﬁnancially constrained. I assume a law of large numbers holds
so that aggregate quantities and prices are deterministic for given government
policy, although each ﬁrm still faces idiosyncratic uncertainty. Figure 3.1
displays the timing of ﬁrm’s decisions.
There are two types of ﬁrms in the economy at each point in time: incumbents
and prospective entrants. At the beginning of each period t, incumbents draw
their current productivity shock, hire labor, produce, pay corporate taxes,
invest in physical capital, and pay dividends to their shareholders. At the
end of the period, they draw the exit shock. This shock can take on two
values: exit or stay. If the ﬁrm receives exit, I assume it sells its capital stock
at the beginning of the following period and forever ceases production.
There is a new entrant drawn from the entrant pool for each ﬁrm that exits
the industry. Potential entrants are ex-ante identical. Upon entering the
industry at time t, each new entrant invests in order to begin producing next
period. New entrants at time t become incumbent ﬁrms at period t+ 1.
To model the U.S. tax structure in the simplest way, I follow Gourio and Miao
[2010]. First, I consider ﬂat tax rates and assume that ﬁrms face corporate
income tax at the constant rate τ c, while households face constant rates τ d on
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the model
dividend, τ i on labor and interest incomes, and τ g on accrued capital gains. 4
Second, I abstract from debt and assume that all ﬁrms are equity ﬁnanced
as in the literature. 5 Accordingly, my model can not assess the eﬀects of
removing the tax beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing. In a similar set-up, Gourio and
Miao [2010] studied how the introduction of debt ﬁnancing aﬀects the eﬀects
of changes in dividend taxation. They ﬁnd smaller equity issuance, and fewer
share of ﬁrms issuing equity.
3.2.1.1 Equity Valuation
In order to formulate the problem of an incumbent, I ﬁrst derive the equity
valuation equation. As the ﬁrm may issue new shares or repurchase old
4. In U.S., capital gains are taxed on realization rather than on accrual. Incorporating
a realization-based capital gain tax would complicate the analysis and is not important
for the key goal of the paper.
5. A lot of papers make this assumption. Some examples are Auerbach and Hassett
[2003], Desai and Goolsbee [2004], and Poterba and Summers [1985].
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shares, equity value at date t+1 satisﬁes pt+1 = p0t+1+zt+1, where zt+1 denotes
the value of new shares issued (repurchased) at period t + 1 if zt+1 ≥ (<)0,
and p0t+1 is the period t + 1 value of equity outstanding in period t. The
no-arbitrage condition (3.1) must hold in equilibrium.
rt+1 =
1
pt
Et
[
(1− τ dt+1)dt+1 + (1− τ gt+1)(p0t+1 − pt)
]
(3.1)
whereEt [·] is the expectation operator conditional on the productivity shocks,
rt+1 is the after-tax required return rate on equity, dt+1 is the ﬁrm’s dividend
payment, and (p0t+1−pt) represents the capital gains component. As the ﬁrm
is owned by the household, the after-tax return on equity equals the after-tax
return on government debt. That is:
rt+1 = (1− τ it )r¯t+1 (3.2)
where r¯t+1 is the pre-tax interest rate. Using equations (3.1)-(3.2), I can
derive:
pt =
1− τ gt+1
(1− τ it+1)r¯t+1 + (1− τ gt+1)
Et
[
1− τ dt+1
1− τ gt+1
dt+1 + pt+1 − zt+1
]
(3.3)
Following Gourio and Miao [2010] in deﬁning the cum-dividend equity value,
Vt+1, at period t+ 1 as:
Vt+1 =
1− τ dt+1
1− τ gt+1
dt+1 + pt+1 − zt+1 (3.4)
One can show that:
pt = Vt − 1− τ
d
t+1
1− τ gt+1
dt + zt
Then, using (3.3) I can derive:
Vt =
1− τ dt
1− τ gt
dt − zt + Et [Vt+1]
1 +
1−τ it+1
1−τgt+1 r¯t+1
(3.5)
3.2.1.2 Incumbent
I consider the problem of the ﬁrm at the steady-state, when government
policy is stationary. Denote by V (kt, εt) the value of an incumbent ﬁrm with
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capital stock kt and productivity shock εt. V (kt, εt) satisﬁes the following
Bellman equation:
V (kt, εt) = max
nt,xt,kt+1,zt,dt
[
1− τ d
1− τ g dt − zt +
ηkt+1 + (1− η)EtV (kt+1, εt+1)
1 + 1−τ
i
1−τg r¯t+1
]
(3.6)
subject to
xt + dt = (1− τ c) [yt − wnt] + zt + τ cδkt (3.7a)
xt = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (3.7b)
zt ≥ 0 (3.7c)
zt ≤ z¯ (3.7d)
dt ≥ ζkt (3.7e)
where output is yt = εtf(kt, nt) = εt
(
kt
αn1−αt
)ν , with 0 < α, ν < 1, and
δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. A decreasing returns to scale technology
ensures that ﬁrm size is always well-deﬁned.r¯t+1 is the pre-tax interest rate
between the period t and the period t+ 1.
Equation (3.7a) describes the ﬂow of funds condition for the ﬁrm. Cash in-
ﬂows consist of output, undepreciated capital and equity issuance, while cash
outﬂows include investment expenditures, tax liabilities, wage and dividend
payments.
Equation (3.7b) is the law motion of capital at the ﬁrm level where δ is the
depreciation rate. Each ﬁrm can invest x to increase its capital stock.
While share repurchases are allowed in the United States, I follow most papers
in the literature to impose the constraint (3.7c) for simplicity. Auerbach
[1979], Auerbach [2002] and Gourio and Miao [2010] among others make this
assumption. 6
The main ﬁnancial frictions in this paper are described by equations (3.7d)
and (3.7e). First, I impose an upper bound, z¯, on the amount of external
funds a ﬁrm has access to, equation (3.7d). Several papers in the literature
highlight the role of informational imperfections in limiting the ability of
ﬁrms to issue new equity. For example, Greenwald et al. [1984] argue that
6. Gourio and Miao [2010], following Poterba and Summers [1985], impose a non-
zero upper bound on share repurchases. They ﬁnd that when ﬁrms can avoid the costly
dividend distribution by using the return on investment to repurchase shares, they make
larger investment and issue more equity to ﬁnance the investment if possible.
70
equity funds may reduce the value of a ﬁrm by intensifying incentive problems
because it allows more proﬁts to be diverted to the private uses of the ﬁrm’s
managers. According to Ross [1977], signalling eﬀects may also restrict a
ﬁrm’s access to equity markets because managers of strong ﬁrms, rely more
on debt than equity. Thus, attempting to sell equity may convey a strong
negative signal about a ﬁrm’s quality and reduce its market value. In this
paper, the ﬁrms will issue equity only if they are dividend constrained because
dividends are heavily taxed than capital gains as in the U.S. tax code.
Second, I impose a minimum dividend payout requirement, equation (3.7e).
While Bianchi [2013] imposes a constant lower limit on dividend payments, I
assume that ﬁrms are subject to a collateral constraint that limits the min-
imum amount of dividend payments to an increasing function (ζ > 0) of
their capital holdings. A special case of this dividend constraint, common
in the literature, is the restriction that dividends need to be non-negative
when ζ = 0. My main motivation for adopting this ﬂexible speciﬁcation
is for calibration purposes. Having ζ > 0 eﬀectively tightens the ﬁnancial
constraints faced by larger ﬁrms. 7 This parameter aﬀords me better control
in matching the average size of entrants relative to the average size of in-
cumbents. A possible justiﬁcation of the constraint (3.7e) is that minimum
dividend payments may help mitigate agency problems between shareholders
and managers and work as signaling device [see Allen and Michaely, 2003, for
a review]. The fact that they’re increasing with ﬁrm size is also consistent
with evidence that large corporations tend to pay out a larger fraction of
their earnings [Allen and Michaely, 2003].
3.2.1.3 New Entrant
In the period of entry, new entrants are identical, do not produce, pay no
dividends and are not subject to corporate tax liability. Their investment
is fully funded by the sales of equity to household sector. I assume that
new entrants are endowed with an amount z¯ of equity, equal to the maximal
amount of external funds incumbents have access to. Therefore, each new
entrant at period t invests ke = z¯ in order to start operating at period t+1.
Accordingly, all the decisions of new entrants can be summarized as follows.
7. Financial constraints are still overall tighter for smaller ﬁrms in the model, since
these tend to be farther away from their unconstrained optimal size.
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zet = z
e = z¯
ket+1 = k
e = z¯
det = d
e = 0.
Given the continuation value of incumbents V , the value of a new entrant is:
V e = −z¯ + 1
1 + 1−τ
i
1−τg r¯
∑
εt+1
π¯(εt+1)V (z¯, εt+1) (3.8)
where π¯(εt+1) is the long-run probability of state εt+1. At period t+ 1, new
entrants at period t are in the same position as an incumbent which has a
stock of capital z¯. The initial productivity of new entrants is drawn from the
stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
3.2.2 Aggregation
Denote the incumbent’s decision rule for investment by k(st), where st ≡
(kt, εt) is the individual state. Let S ≡ K × E denote the set of individual
states, where K is the set of capital stock levels. Let ΩS denote the product
σ − algebra on S with typical subset S. We can summarize the aggregate
distribution of ﬁrms with a measure deﬁned over the state space S. Formally
we deﬁne the measure μt as follows:
μt : ΩS → R+
A → μt(A),
where μt(A) is the mass of ﬁrms engaged in production at time t, with state
st ∈ A ⊆ S. This includes incumbents as of t − 1 which survive into t, and
the new entrants replacing the exiters as of t− 1.
First deﬁne the transition function Q of incumbents across states:
Q : S × ΩS → [0, 1]
(st, K × E) → Q(st, K × E) =
∑
εt+1∈E
π(εt+1, εt)1k(st)∈K
where 1K is the indicator function on the set K.
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For any Borel set A ∈ ΩS, the law motion of the aggregate state of the
economy is:
μt+1(A) = (1− η)
ˆ
S
Q(s,A)μt(s)ds+ ηψ(A), (3.9)
where ψ is the distribution of new entrants,
ψ(K × E) =
∑
εt+1∈E
π¯ (εt+1)1ke∈K . (3.10)
The stationary distribution μ is deﬁned as the ﬁxed point of this mapping.
It is useful to deﬁne aggregate investment.
it =
ˆ
S
kt+1(s)dμt(s)− (1− δ)
[
(1− η)
ˆ
S
kt(s)dμt−1(s) + ηke
]
+
η
[
ke −
ˆ
S
kt(s)dμt−1(s)
]
, (3.11)
where the ﬁrst two terms correspond to the total gross investment of incum-
bent ﬁrms as of time t (which includes the fraction 1− η of those that were
already operating at t− 1, plus the fraction η of new entrants at t− 1), and
the last term corresponds to the investment of new entrants as of time t net
of the disinvestment of exiters.
3.2.3 Household
A representative household with unit measure derives utility from consump-
tion alone, according to a standard time-additive utility function u(c) = log c,
with future utility discounted at rate 0 < β < 1. A time endowment of 1
is supplied inelastically every period. The household is subject to dividend
taxes τ d, personal income taxes τ i, and capital gain taxes τ g.
The household holds wealth as shares in ﬁrms. It also trades government
bond in zero net supply. Let θt(s) denote the shareholding of ﬁrm type s ∈ S
at the start of period t (θet for new entrants), valued at price pt(s) at the
end of period t (pet for new entrants), and bt the government bondholding,
paying interest rate rt. At the start of period t, the share of incumbent type
s is valued at price p0t (s), which is the period t value of equity outstanding
in period t− 1. The diﬀerence, pt(s)− p0t (s), is the capital gains in period t.
These prices are time-invariant in a stationary equilibrium.
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Let W denote the indirect utility of the household, its maximization program
is as follows:
Wt(ωt) = max
ct,bt+1,θet+1,{θt+1(s)}s∈S
{log ct + βWt+1(ωt+1)} (3.12)
subject to
ct + bt+1 + ηp
e
tθ
e
t+1 +
ˆ
S
pt(s)θt+1(s)dμt(s) = ωt
ωt+1 ≡ (1− τ it+1)wt+1+(1+(1− τ it+1)r¯t+1)bt+1+ η
ˆ
kt+1(s)θt+1(s)dμt(s)+
η
ˆ [
p0t+1(s) + (1− τ dt+1)dt+1(s)− τ gt+1
(
p0t+1(s)− pt(s)
)]
θet+1dμt+1(s)+Tt+1+
(1−η)
ˆ [
p0t+1(s) + (1− τ dt+1)dt+1(s)− τ gt+1
(
p0t+1(s)− pt(s)
)]
θt+1(s)dμt+1(s)
(3.13)
Equation (??) is the household’s budget constraint. The consumer spends
his resources ωt on consumption, government bonds, and equity purchases of
incumbents plus new entrants at time t. Income from (3.13) equals transfers
from the government, plus labor earnings, plus the income from government
bondholdings, plus the income from physical capital sales of exiting ﬁrms,
plus the income from shareholding in ﬁrms engaged in production. The latter
equals the dividend plus share value of new entrants at time t and surviving
incumbents from t to t+ 1.
The sole outcome from the household’s problem which is relevant for my
analysis is the real interest determination. From the ﬁrst-order condition for
government bonds
ct+1
ct
= β(1 + (1− τ it+1)r¯t+1) (3.14)
and in steady-state I obtain 1 = β(1 + (1− τ i)r¯) = β(1 + r).
3.2.4 Government
In each period, the government collects corporate proﬁt taxes, dividend taxes,
capital gain taxes and personal incomes taxes at rates τ c, τ d, τ g, and τ i, re-
spectively. To isolate eventual eﬀects associated with using distortionary
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taxation to ﬁnance government spending, I assume that there is no govern-
ment spending and the tax revenue collected is rebated to the household in a
lump sum manner. Thus, in a stationary equilibrium with zero government,
the government’s budget constraint is:
T = τ c
ˆ
S
[y(s)− wn(s)− δk]dμ(s) + τ d
ˆ
d(s)dμ(s)−
τ g
ˆ
z(s)dμ(s) + τ iw, (3.15)
3.2.5 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Now, I provide a deﬁnition of the equilibrium, focusing on the steady-state.
Given a stationary government policy (τ c, τ d, τ i, τ g, T ) and initial equity is-
suance θ¯e for new entrants, a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium
consists of a value function V (st), with st ≡ (kt, εt), and a set of decision
rules for incumbents, n(st), k(st), y(st) and d(st), a value function V e for
new entrants, a value function W and a set of decisions for the representa-
tive household c, b, θe and {θ(st)}st∈S, time-invariant cross-sectional distri-
butions of new entrants and incumbents, respectively μ and ψ, and prices r,
w, {p(st)}st∈S and pe such that:
1. Given prices, the government budget constraint in (3.15) holds.
2. Given prices and the government policy, all types of ﬁrms and the
representative household optimize.
3. All markets clear:
— Labor:
ˆ
S
n(s)dμ(s) = 1.
— Equity:
new entrants: θe = 1.
incumbents: θ(s) = 1, for all s ∈ S.
— Final good:
ˆ
S
y(s)dμ(s) = i+ c, where i is deﬁned in (3.11).
4. μ is the ﬁxed point in (3.9), and ψ is deﬁned in (3.10).
3.3 Investment and Financing Policies
In order to assess the ﬁrm-level eﬀects of corporate tax reforms, it proves
useful to analyze the ﬁnancial and investment policies of a single incumbent
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in partial equilibrium. Let qt, λdt , λ
z
t , λ
z¯
t be the Lagrange multipliers associated
to the constraints (3.7b - 3.7e), respectively. The Lagrangian of the problem
can be written as follows:
L(qt, λdt , λzt , λz¯t , kt+1, dt) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− τ d
1− τ g dt − zt + qt(xt − kt+1 + (1− δ)kt)
+λdt (dt − ζkt) + λzt zt − λz¯t (zt − z¯)
+
[ηkt+1 + (1− η)Et(Vt+1)]
1 + 1−τ
i
1−τg r¯t+1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(3.16)
Using equation (3.7a) to eliminate dt, we obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Optimality Conditions
nt : wt = εtF2(kt, nt) (3.17a)
zt :
1− τ d
1− τ g + λ
d
t + λ
z
t − λz¯t = 1 (3.17b)
xt : qt =
1− τ d
1− τ g + λ
d
t (3.17c)
kt+1 : qt =
[
η + (1− η)Et
(
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
)]
1 + 1−τ
i
1−τg r¯t+1
(3.17d)
λdt : λ
d
t (dt − ζkt) = 0;λdt ≥ 0
λzt : λ
z
t zt = 0;λ
z
t ≥ 0
λz¯t : λ
z¯
t (zt − z¯t) = 0;λz¯t ≥ 0
Envelop Condition
∂Vt
∂kt
= qt(1− δ)− ζλdt +
(
1− τ d
1− τ g + λ
d
t
)
[δτ c + (1− τ c)εtF1(kt, nt)]
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Euler Equation
1− τ d
1− τ g + λ
d
t =
η
1 + 1−τ
i
1−τg r¯t+1
+
1− η
1 + 1−τ
i
1−τg r¯t+1
Et
⎧⎨
⎩
((1− τ c)εtF1(kt+1, nt+1) + δτ c + (1− δ)) ∗(
1− τ d
1− τ g + λ
d
t+1
)
− ζλdt+1
⎫⎬
⎭ (3.18)
Equation (3.17a) shows that the ﬁnancial constraints don’t aﬀect the em-
ployment decision of the ﬁrm. It hires up to the point where the marginal
productivity of labor equals the wage established in the labor market.
The ﬁnancial policy of the ﬁrm is determined by equation (3.17b). To inter-
pret this equation, let focus ﬁrst on a ﬁrm for which the maximum equity-
issuance constraint is not binding, i.e. λz¯t = 0. The left side of (3.17b)
represents the marginal beneﬁt to the shareholder of raising one unit of new
equity. It says that, issuing one unit of new equity to pay dividends relaxes
the dividend constraint and the shareholder receives
1− τ d
1− τ g as dividend after
tax. When the equity-issuance constraint is binding, λz¯t measures the value
of one additional dollar of new equity for the ﬁrm.
qt in (3.17c) is the shadow price of investment and can be referred to as the
marginal q. The investment policy of the ﬁrm is described by (3.18). The
left side of (3.18) represents the marginal cost of investment, while the right
side represents the marginal beneﬁt of investment. This marginal gain from
investment consists of the un-depreciated capital and the after-tax marginal
product of capital.
In an economy where there is no tax diﬀerential between dividend payments
and retained earnings, i.e. τ d = τ g, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy is irrelevant
if the maximum equity-issuance constraint is not binding. In order words,
if τ d = τ g, λz¯t = 0 ⇒ λzt = λdt = 0. In this case, the capital structure of
the ﬁrm does not matter for its value. This is the well-known Miller and
Modigliani [1961]’s theorem. However, the ﬁnancial policy of the ﬁrm aﬀects
its value if τ d = τ g. If one assumes τ d > τ g as in the United States before
the 2003’s dividend tax cut, it is impossible to have λzt = λ
d
t = 0. Otherwise,
equation (3.17b) implies that
1− τ d
1− τ g − λ
z¯
t = 1 which is unfeasible because
1− τ d
1− τ g < 1. In fact, it is not optimal for the ﬁrm to simultaneously raise new
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equity and distribute higher dividends than the minimum requirement. The
intuition is that to maximize equity value, the ﬁrm should reduce dividends
and use retained earnings to ﬁnance investment because dividends are heavily
taxed than capital gains. Thus, one of the constraints (3.7c) and (3.7d) must
be binding. In addition, both (3.7d) and (3.7e) can not be simultaneously
binding. In fact, zt = 0 implies zt < z¯ because z¯ > 0. In addition, zt = z¯
implies zt > 0 because z¯ > 0. Given these observations, a ﬁrm can be in four
diﬀerent ﬁnance regimes characterized as follows:
1. Equity-constrained regime: zt = z¯; dt = ζkt,
kt+1 = (1− τ c)(1− ν(1− α))
[
εtk
αν
t
(
ν(1− α)
wt
)ν(1−α)] 11−ν(1−α)
+
(1− δ + ζ + δτ c)kt + z¯.
2. Cash-constrained regime: 0 < zt < z¯; dt = ζkt; λzt = λ
z¯
t = 0; λ
d
t =
τd − τ g
1− τ g ; and kt+1 solves the equation:
1 +
1− τ i
1− τ g r¯t+1 = η+
(1− η)Et
⎧⎨
⎩
((1− τ c)εtF1(kt+1, nt+1) + δτ c + (1− δ)) ∗(
1− τ d
1− τ g + λ
d
t+1
)
− ζλdt+1
⎫⎬
⎭
3. Internal-growth regime: zt = 0; dt = ζkt; and λz¯t = 0.
4. Cash-rich regime: zt = 0; dt > ζkt; λz¯t = λ
d
t = 0, and λ
z
t =
τd − τ g
1− τ g .
The number of ﬁnancing regimes as well as their characterization, constitute
a key distinction between this paper and the existing literature. In contrast
to Gourio and Miao [2010] and Gomes [2001], my model features four ﬁnance
regimes instead of three. The regimes in Gomes [2001] are generated by the
transaction costs of external ﬁnancing. In Gourio and Miao [2010], they
stem from the diﬀerential tax treatments between capital gain and dividend.
While my model shares some resemblance with Gourio and Miao [2010] in
this aspect, it integrates an overall borrowing constraint which is absent in
Gourio and Miao [2010]. More precisely, the upper bound on equity issuance
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in my model may prevent the ﬁrm from ﬁnancing investment with positive
net return while in Gourio and Miao [2010], the ﬁrm may issue an inﬁnite
amount of new equity. Next, I present the typical trajectory of a ﬁrm through
the ﬁnancing regimes post-entry.
3.4 Firm Transition Across ﬁnance Regimes
To illustrate the transition of ﬁrms across ﬁnance regimes, the red, the blue
and the magenta curves in ﬁgure 3.2 plot for a given productivity shock,
the investment, the dividend and the equity issuance policies as functions of
initial capital. The dashed vertical lines delimit the diﬀerent ﬁnance regimes.
Moving from the left to the right in ﬁgure 3.2, the ﬁrst regime is the equity-
constrained regime in which ﬁrms are the smallest ones. They reduce divi-
dend to the minimum requirement, raise equity to the maximum admissible
value in addition to their internal cash ﬂows to fund investment. Moreover,
they still have unused investment opportunities, which can not be ﬁnanced
because they are liquidity-constrained. Therefore, they adjust their size grad-
ually, not being able to instantaneously jump to their optimal size. 8
The second regime is the cash-constrained regime. Firms in this regime are
relatively larger than in the equity-constrained regime. Neither the upper-
bound on equity issuance, nor the share repurchase constraint are binding.
However, ﬁrms do not generate enough cash ﬂows to internally ﬁnance in-
vestment. They reduce dividend to the minimum requirement and tap into
the equity market to ﬁnance investment. In this regime, the left-hand side of
equation 3.18 shows that the marginal cost of investment equals 1. Accord-
ingly, all ﬁrms in this regime increase their capital stock until their expected
marginal product of capital equals 1. Thus, all of them choose the same
capital level implying an horizontal investment decision rule. To reach this
size, relatively smaller ﬁrms issue more equity than larger ones to ﬁnance
investment.
The third regime is the internal-growth regime. In this regime, ﬁrms are
relatively larger than the ones in previous two regimes. In addition, they
8. Accordingly, they are expanding and their investment decision rule has a positive
slope.
∂kt+1
∂kt
(wt) = (1−τ c)(1−ν(1−α))
[
εtk
−(1−ν)
t
(
ν(1− α)
wt
)ν(1−α)] 11−ν(1−α)
+(1−δ+
ζ + δτ c) > 0
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Figure 3.2: Firm Transition Across ﬁnance Regimes
generate enough internal funds to ﬁnance investment. The marginal product
of capital does not warrant raising funds externally, but it is high enough so
that the value of one dollar invested in the ﬁrm is higher than the value of a
dollar invested outside of the ﬁrms. Firms reduce dividend to the minimum
possible and do not issue new equity because of the tax-diﬀerential. As ﬁrm
are still dividend-constrained, they adjust their size gradually. In contrast
to the previous two regimes, the marginal source of investment ﬁnance is
retained earnings.
The last regime is the cash-rich regime. Here, only the share repurchase
constraint is binding. Cash-rich ﬁrms are large enough not to be dividend
constrained and jump instantaneously to their optimal size. They generate
enough cash ﬂows to internally ﬁnance investment and to distribute larger
dividends than the minimum payout policy. Moreover, they do not raise
equity and the marginal source of investment ﬁnance is retained earnings.
In summary, a ﬁrm in the equity-constrained or the cash-constrained regimes
raises equity to ﬁnance investment while in other regimes, the marginal source
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of investment ﬁnance is retained earnings. Figure 3.2 shows that equity-
constrained or cash-constrained ﬁrms tap into the equity market and reduce
dividend to the minimum possible. Largest ﬁrms use internal funds to ﬁnance
investment and distribute much dividend than the minimum requirement.
Finally, medium-size ﬁrms in the internal growth regime do not issue equity
and reduce dividend to the minimum possible. The transition of a ﬁrm across
regimes depends on the history of productivity shocks it experiences along
its lifetime. Consequently, a ﬁrm starting from the equity-constrained regime
does not have to transit successively across the cash-constrained regime and
the internal-growth regime before reaching the cash-rich regime.
3.5 Model Solution and Calibration
Because this model does not permit closed form solution, I resort to numeri-
cal methods. I provide a detail description of the numerical algorithm in the
Appendix. The model is calibrated on U.S. data for establishment-level in-
vestment dynamics. 9 This data is reported annually, thus one model period
corresponds to one calendar year. My parameters can be classiﬁed into two
groups. The ﬁrst group includes parameters I set a priori and are reported
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Parameters selected a priori
Parameter Value Source
Return to scale υ 0.85 Atkeson and Kehoe [2005] and others
Capital elasticity α 1/3 income share data
Discount factor β 0.96 interest rate of 4%
Exit probability η 0.05 Evans [1987], Lee and Mukoyama [2012]
Tax rates Gourio and Miao [2010]
Corporate income τ c 0.34
Individual income τ i 0.25
Dividend τd 0.25
Capital Gains τ g 0.20
9. Although I calibrate the model to establishment-level data, I still refer to production
units in my model as ﬁrms.
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Tax system. The tax rates follow closely the ones in Gourio and Miao
[2010] and set the corporate income tax rate τ c = 0.34. In addition, I assume
that the representative household has an average income which falls into the
lowest of the top four tax brackets at the income tax rate τ i = 0.25. As
dividends are taxed at the personal income tax rate, I set the dividend tax
rate τ d = 0.25. This household faces the capital gains tax rate τ g = 0.20.
The return to scale parameter ν = 0.85 has a standard value in the literature
employing the same production function speciﬁcation as mine [Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008, Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005, Pavcnik, 2002, Veracierto, 2001,
Atkenson et al., 1996, Gomes, 2001, Clementi and Palazzo, 2013], as is the
capital share parameter α = 1/3. 10 An annual exit rate of 5% is in the middle
range of the estimates provided by Evans [1987] and Lee and Mukoyama
[2012].
The parameters calibrated internally, by requiring the model to match a set
of moments, are presented in Table 3.2. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated
to deliver an aggregate investment-to-capital ratio of 0.069. This is the same
value used by Khan and Thomas [2013], and is based on private capital
stock estimates from the Fixed Asset Tables, controlling for growth, for the
1954-2002 period.
The process for ﬁrm level productivity shocks is estimated by ﬁtting anAR(1)
process:
ln εt = ρ ln εt−1 + ςt (3.19)
where ςt follows an i.i.d. standard normal distribution with mean γ and
variance σ2. For solving the model, this process is discretized into a 5-state
Markov chain using the quadrature method of Tauchen and Hussey [1991].
The three parameters of the AR(1) process are selected to match three cross-
sectional moments: (i) a standard deviation of investment rates as a fraction
of capital of 0.337, and (ii) an average investment rate of 0.122, both as
reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger [2006], (iii) a standard deviation of the
cash to assets ratio of 0.161, as reported by Khan and Thomas [2013] using
Compustat data for the 1954-2011 period.
The parameters governing the extent of ﬁnancial frictions are key. I infer
them by requiring that the model matches two additional moments relating
to the plant-level dynamics: (i) an average employment size of new entrants
10. In order to arrive at a 1/3 capital share in this model, I assume that the proﬁts
ﬁrms generate after incurring investment expenditures and making payments to labor are
attributed to capital and labor according to the shares α and 1− α.
82
Table 3.2: Internal calibration
Parameter Value Target Data Model
Depreciation rate δ 0.069 avg(i)/avg(k) 0.069 0.069
Productivity γ 0 sd (i/k) 0.337 0.317
shock process σ 0.231 avg (i/k) 0.122 0.139
ρ 0.577 sd (cf/k) 0.161 0.149
Borrowing z¯ 1.853 avg(cf)/avg(k) 0.102 0.107
limit ζ 0.015 Rel size entrants 0.600 0.627
(ﬁrms in their ﬁrst production year) of 60% of the average size of incumbents,
as reported by Lee and Mukoyama [2012] using data from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) for the 1972-1997 period;
(ii) an aggregate cash-to-asset ratio of 0.102, as reported Khan and Thomas
[2013] for Compustat data.
My calibration implies d¯ > 0 and ζ > 0. As pointed out previously, this
implies binding borrowing constraints, which are overall tighter for smaller
ﬁrms. To illustrate this point, Figure 3.3 plots the ratio of actual to uncon-
strained investment levels in the model as a function of current capital (ﬁrm
size). Two lines are plotted, one for a high and the other for a low value of
current (hence expected future) productivity. A value of one means the ﬁrm
is operating at the unconstrained level, and the lower the ratio the tighter
the borrowing constraint is. The parameter ζ allows me to control how fast
this ratio increases with ﬁrm size. As the ﬁgure illustrates, the magnitude
I obtain for ζ is still consistent with smaller ﬁrms, which generate less cash
ﬂows, being the most constrained. See Beck et al. [2005] and Angelini and
Generale [2008] for some evidence consistent with this model prediction.
The ﬁgure also shows that high productivity ﬁrms are more constrained,
given their higher unconstrained optimal level of investment. My calibration,
namely the degree of persistence of the productivity shocks, is such that this
eﬀect always dominates the eﬀect of higher current cash-ﬂows due to higher
current productivity.
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Figure 3.3: Tightness of the Dividend Constraint
3.6 Steady-State Implications
Now, I discuss the model’s implications to ensure that the extent of ﬁnancial
frictions allows it to replicate salient features of ﬁrm-level data at the steady-
state.
3.6.1 Firm Size Distribution and Firm Growth
In this section, I describe and compare the model’s implications for ﬁrm size
distribution and ﬁrm growth with the empirical evidence. Figure 3.4a dis-
plays a right-skewed employment distribution which resembles its empirical
counterpart in the U.S. [Hsieh and Klenow, 2014, Henly and Sanchez, 2009].
This result implies that in stationary equilibrium, there is a big mass of small
ﬁrms and a small mass of large ﬁrms. The result holds true even when I use
capital as a measure of size.
Figure 3.4b plots average employment growth conditional on ﬁrm employ-
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Figure 3.4: Firm Dynamics
ment. The model’s implications are consistent with the empirical evidence
that ﬁrm growth is unconditionally negatively correlated with size as reported
by Dunne et al. [1988]. Models along the lines of Hopenhayn’s (1992), such
as mine, deliver this implication due in large measure to the mean-reverting
nature of the stochastic process for productivity.
In my speciﬁc case, an additional mechanism contributes to generating the
right unconditional correlation between growth and size. In fact, there are
two state variables: productivity and capital. If I consider all the ﬁrms with
the same employment, Hopenhayn [1992] predicts that they will behave iden-
tically. Here, they may behave diﬀerently depending on their current capital
stock and productivity shock. In fact, some of these ﬁrms are characterized
by a relatively low capital and high shock, and others by a relatively high
capital and low shock because ﬁnancial constraints prevent the instantaneous
adjustment of capital to the ﬁrst-best implied by productivity. The former
will grow faster because investment and capital are catching up the optimal
size induced by productivity. The latter will shrink as the scale of production
is adjusted to the new lower level of productivity. These features are shared
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by other models with pre-determined capital and either ﬁnancial frictions
or adjustment costs to capital [e.g Khan and Thomas, 2013, Clementi and
Palazzo, 2013].
3.6.2 Job Turnover
While I do not target employment dynamics in the calibration, the model
delivers some quantitative implications consistent with the data. Table 3.3
reports the job creation and job destruction in stationary equilibrium and in
the data ( Lee and Mukoyama [2012]).
Table 3.3: Job Creation and Job Destruction
Job creation Job destruction
Model Data Model Data
Total 25 9 25 10
Relative Contribution
Startups 13 17 0 0
Mature 87 83 80 76
Exiters 0 0 20 24
The job creation is deﬁned in the usual way, as the total employment change
among growing ﬁrms and new entrants relative to the initial employment
size across all ﬁrms. The job destruction rate is deﬁned in an analogous way
among shrinking ﬁrms and exiters. The table shows that, in the aggregate,
the model is unable to deliver the job creation and job destruction rate in the
data. This is in part due to the way I model entry (initial productivity drawn
from the unconditional distribution) and exit (random across all incumbents).
The relative contribution of the diﬀerent ﬁrm types, however, is totally in
line with the data, in spite of this not being a calibration target. Mature
incumbents are responsible for most job creation and destruction in the econ-
omy.
3.6.3 Distribution of ﬁrms across ﬁnance regimes
I suppose that the economy under the parameter values in Tables 3.1, and
3.2 has reached the steady-state. As ﬁrms in diﬀerent ﬁnance regimes may
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respond to the tax cuts in diﬀerent ways, it proves useful to discuss ﬁrst
the ﬁnance regime for the ﬁrms in the cross section. Table 3.4 presents the
distribution of ﬁrms across ﬁnance regimes at the stationary equilibrium.
The share of ﬁrms for a regime is equal to the total number of ﬁrms in that
regime divided by the total number of ﬁrms in all regimes. The average
capital (respectively output, equity issuance) for a regime is equal to the
total capital stock (respectively output and equity issuance) of all ﬁrms in
that regime divided by the number of ﬁrms in the regime.
Table 3.4: Firms’ Distribution across Finance Regimes
τ g = 0.20 Equity Cash Internal Cash
τ d = 0.25 Constrained Constrained Growth Rich
τ c = 0.34 Regime Regime Regime Regime
Share of ﬁrms 2 10 45 43
Average Capital 3.19 2.08 2.86 4.04
Average Output 5.16 1.92 1.45 1.49
Average Equity 1.85 0.88 0 0
issuance
Table 3.4 reveals that the cash-rich ﬁrms represent 43% of the ﬁrm distribu-
tion. In average, ﬁrms in the cash-rich regime are the largest in the economy
and do not issue equity. In addition, they produce less output in average
than ﬁrms in other regimes, implying that they are less productive in av-
erage. In fact, the ratio of average output to average capital is a proxy of
average productivity. This ratio equals 1.62, 0.92, 0.51, 0.37 for ﬁrms in
equity-constrained, cash-constrained, internal growth and cash-rich regimes,
respectively. Firms in the internal-growth regime represent 45% of the over-
all distribution at steady state. As cash-rich ﬁrms, they do not raise new
equity. Firms in the internal-growth and cash-constrained regime are the
smallest ones. In average, a cash-constrained ﬁrm is smaller than a ﬁrm
in the internal-growth regime but produces more output. This result sug-
gests that Cash-constrained ﬁrms are relatively more productive than those
which are growing internally. Their marginal productivity of capital is high
enough that they tap into the equity market to ﬁnance investment and to pay
dividends. In average, equity-constrained ﬁrms are the most productive at
steady-state. Consequently, they also issue new equity to ﬁnance investment
87
and are of medium-size. Equity-constrained and cash-constrained ﬁrms con-
stitute, respectively, 10% and 2% of the total number of ﬁrms. These results
reﬂect the fact that most ﬁrms do not tap the equity market because the tax
diﬀerential between capital gain and dividend makes equity issuance costly.
3.7 Tax Reform Experiments
To analyze the eﬀects of the CBIT, I concentrate on a revenue-neutral tax
reform which uses only the corporate proﬁt tax to raise revenue on businesses
as proposed by U.S. Treasury Department in 1992. I proceed in three steps
and consider two experiments. I start by an experiment in which capital gain
and dividend taxes are eliminated with no changes to the other taxes. I ﬁnd
that the tax cuts are not self-ﬁnancing and the corporate proﬁt tax rate needs
to be adjusted upward from 34% to 42% to keep the reform revenue-neutral.
Thereafter, I assess the eﬀects of a tax reform which abolishes the dividend
and capital gain taxes and increases the corporate proﬁt tax rate to 42%. I
assume that the tax changes are permanent in order to study the long run
steady-state eﬀects.
After each tax experiment, I compute the percentage change in aggregate
variables from the initial steady-state. Table 3.5 reports the aggregate ef-
fects of the two experiments, while Table 3.6 reports the eﬀects on the ﬁrm-
distribution across ﬁnance regimes. All aggregate variables are measured in
percentage deviation from the initial steady-state.
3.7.1 Elimination of Dividend and Capital Gain Taxes
I begin by the experiment in which both the capital gain and the dividend
taxes are eliminated permanently with no changes to the corporate proﬁt
tax rate. As both taxes disappear, the tax diﬀerential between capital gain
and equity vanishes and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy becomes irrelevant. It
does not matter for the ﬁrm’s value the amount of earnings to retain as
internal ﬁnance, rather than distributing dividends and raising equity in the
external equity market. Thus, the values of dividend and new equity are
indeterminate, and it becomes impossible to diﬀerentiate the ﬁrms in cash-
constrained regime from those in internal growth regime. Both are marked
as "N/A" in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.6.
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Table 3.5: Aggregate Eﬀects of Tax Reforms
τ g = 0 τ g = 0
Aggregate Changes τ d = 0 τ d = 0
(%) τ c = 0.34 τ c = 0.42
Quantities
Capital 8.06 -8.79
Output 3.72 -1.22
Consumption 2.99 0.05
Prices
Wage 3.27 -1.19
Share Value 17.69 -1.55
Table 3.6: Eﬀects on the Distribution of Firms
Equity Cash Internal Cash
Constrained Constrained Growth Rich
Regime Regime Regime Regime
Initial steady-state
τ g = 0.20, τd = 0.25, τ c = 0.34
Share of ﬁrms 2 10 45 43
Average Size 3.19 2.08 2.86 4.04
Zero div. and cap. gain
taxes
τ g = τd = 0, τ c = 0.34
Share of ﬁrms 31 N/A N/A 56
Average Size 3.07 N/A N/A 3.94
CBIT reform
τ g = τd = 0, τ c = 0.42
Share of ﬁrms 22 N/A N/A 61
Average Size 3.41 N/A N/A 3.24
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Column 2 of Table 3.5 reveals that the elimination of capital gain and divi-
dend taxes, results in an increase in long-run aggregate capital stock, output,
consumption, wage and stock price.
Investment may increase after the tax cuts for two reasons. First, the tax
cuts remove the tax diﬀerential between equity and dividend. Thus, prof-
itable ﬁrms in the cash-constrained or the internal-growth regime tap into
the equity market to invest more after the tax cuts. Second, the ﬁrm’s prob-
lem (equation 3.6) shows that the discount factor of the ﬁrm is given by
r¯(1− τ i)/(1− τ g), which equals the after-tax return required by equity own-
ers. Therefore, a decrease in τ g reduces the cost of investment for all ﬁrms.
Both eﬀects boost investment and imply an increase in aggregate capital,
output and labor demand. In response, wage increases to clear labor market
because labor supply is inelastic. Consistent with this intuition, Column 2
of Table 3.5 shows that the wage rate increases by 3.27%.
Consumption increases because the elimination of dividend and capital gain
taxes raises equity values. In fact, it comes from equation (3.5) that starting
from a situation in which the capital gain tax rate is lower than the dividend
tax rate, the elimination of both taxes increases the factor
1− τ d
1− τ g from a
value lower than 1 to 1, increasing the value of all ﬁrms. Higher wage and
share values make shareholders wealthier and induce them to consume more.
Table 3.6 reveals that the tax cuts also aﬀects the distribution of ﬁrms across
ﬁnance regimes. This eﬀect works through two direct channels. By increasing
cash-ﬂows, the tax cuts ﬁrstly release the constraint on initially constrained
ﬁrms. As a result, some medium-size and initially constrained ﬁrms increase
investment and join the cash-rich regime. Secondly, external equity and re-
tained earnings become perfect substitutes as sources of investment ﬁnancing.
Thus, some small and relatively highly productive ﬁrms, which are initially in
cash-constrained or internal growth regimes, issue equity up to the maximum
amounts admissible. Consistent with these intuitions, Columns 2 and 5 in
Table 3.6 show that the proportions of equity-constrained and cash-rich ﬁrms
increase after the tax cuts in comparison to the initial steady-state. More-
over, larger ﬁrms may initially have incentives to re-invest retained earnings
in projects with below-market yield due to the tax advantage of capital gains.
As the policy abolishes this tax asymmetry, it reduces these incentives, gen-
erating disincentives for over-accumulation of capital by larger ﬁrms. The
reduction in the average size of equity-constrained and cash-rich ﬁrms in
comparison to the initial steady-state, as reported in columns 2 and 5 of
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Table 3.6 highlights this eﬀect.
3.7.2 Eﬀects of the CBIT Reform
I now focus on the experiment in which both dividend and capital gain taxes
are eliminated permanently, and corporate proﬁt tax is adjusted upward to
keep the reform revenue-neutral. This experiment is the prototype of the
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) reform proposed by the U.S.
Department of Treasury. From 34%, my numerical simulation implies that
the corporate proﬁt tax rate should be increased to 42% for the reform to be
revenue-neutral. Column 3 of Table 3.5 reports the aggregate eﬀects of the
reform.
Starting from the steady-state with zero capital gain and dividend taxes, Ta-
ble 3.6 reveals that the increase in corporate proﬁt taxes is accompanied by a
reduction of the number of equity-constrained ﬁrms while the proportion of
cash-rich ﬁrms increases. This eﬀect on the ﬁrm distribution is explained by
the lower net return on investment, induced by the higher corporate proﬁt
tax. In fact, lower after tax marginal productivity of capital implies lower
after-tax net return if the marginal cost of investment is unchanged. Con-
sequently, some equity-constrained ﬁrms reduce equity issuance and move
to another regime, reducing the number of equity-constrained ﬁrms. In ad-
dition, lower after-tax marginal productivity of capital reduces the optimal
size of ﬁrms. Therefore, some medium size ﬁrms (initially in the internal
growth regime) become less willing to invest. The reduction in investment
allows them to pay more dividends, releasing the dividend constraint. As
a result, they join the cash-rich regime, increasing the number of cash-rich
ﬁrms increases.
It also appears from Table 3.6 that the average cash-rich ﬁrm shrinks, while
equity-constrained ﬁrms expand in average. Cash-rich ﬁrms shrink because
their after-tax marginal productivity of capital declines and their marginal
cost of investment is unchanged. Initially, equity-constrained ﬁrms are ﬁrms
which have unused investment opportunities because they are borrowing con-
strained. For those ﬁrms, an increase in the corporate proﬁt tax has two
opposite eﬀects. 11 The higher tax rate reduces the after-tax return on in-
vestment, but the reduction in wage increases their disposable current rev-
11. kt+1 = (1−τ c)(1−ν(1−α))
[
εtk
αν
t
(
ν(1− α)
wt
)ν(1−α)] 11−ν(1−α)
+(1−δ+ζ+δτ c)kt+z¯.
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enue and relaxes the constraint on investment. The net eﬀects depend on
how constrained the ﬁrm is in the steady-state with no dividend and capital
gain taxes, and the magnitude of the corporate proﬁt tax increase. In my
numerical experiment, the former eﬀect dominates the latter. This explains
the expansion of equity-constrained ﬁrms. The fact that ﬁrms in the equity
constrained regime are more productive than larger ﬁrms in the cash-rich
regime suggests that there is a positive capital reallocation from large and
low productivity ﬁrms to small and highly productive ﬁrms because.
Compared with the initial steady-state before the tax reform, the increase
in the corporate proﬁt tax rate plays in opposite direction to the eﬀects of
eliminating capital gain and dividend taxes. This implies lower after-tax re-
turn, discouraging investment. In my numerical experiment, this negative
eﬀect dominates the positive eﬀects on investment obtained under the pre-
vious experiment. As a result, Column 3 of Table 3.5 reveals that, following
the CBIT reform, the long-run aggregate capital stock and output decrease,
while consumption increases. Lower capital demand reduces the aggregate
demand for labor. In the new equilibrium, wage goes down to clear the labor
market because labor supply is inelastic, as reported in Column 3 of Table 3.5.
Firms’ value also decreases as the higher corporate proﬁt tax rate reduces the
after-tax return on equity. Aggregate consumption increases because the re-
duction in output is less than proportional to the decline in investment. This
positive eﬀect on consumption is mainly explained by the positive capital re-
allocation across ﬁrms. As in the previous experiment, the elimination of the
tax wedge reduces the distortion on the investment of ﬁrms, which are not
cash-rich. But, an additional force contributes to the better capital allocation
in the current experiment. In fact, higher corporate proﬁt tax discourages
investment from unconstrained ﬁrms. However, the induced lower wage al-
lows initially borrowing-constrained (especially equity-constrained) ﬁrms to
expand because it increases their disposable current cash ﬂows. This im-
proves the eﬃciency of capital allocation because equity-constrained ﬁrms
are the most productive. I analyze the eﬃciency and welfare eﬀects of the
tax reform in the next section.
3.7.3 Productivity and Welfare Eﬀects
I have shown that the CBIT reform has two opposite eﬀects on long run
capital accumulation. The elimination of capital gain and dividend taxes
stimulates long run capital formation, while the increase in corporate proﬁt
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tax rate discourages investment. Overall, the reform reduces aggregate capi-
tal accumulation. Although lower capital accumulation implies lower output,
the tax reform leads to an increase in consumption because the reduction in
output is less than proportional to the decline in aggregate investment. This
fact suggests that there is an improvement in capital allocation across ﬁrms
in diﬀerent ﬁnance regimes, which may generate some productivity gains.
In this paper, I use the total factor productivity
(
TFP = Y/KανN ν(1−α)
)
to
quantify the productivity gain as in Gourio and Miao [2010]. The higher the
TFP, the more eﬃcient the allocation of inputs across ﬁrms. In addition,
I use the correlation between capital and productivity level to assess how
eﬃciently capital is allocated. According to Gourio and Miao [2010], the
higher the correlation between capital and productivity, the more eﬃcient
the allocation of capital across ﬁrms. The eﬃciency of labor allocation is
measured by the labor productivity (Y/L) . 12 A higher labor productivity
also implies a better allocation of labor across ﬁrms.
The general equilibrium framework also allows to conduct welfare analysis.
To evaluate the welfare eﬀect, it is important to make the distinction between
the utility gain in steady state and the utility gain during transition. Since
my interest is in the long run eﬀects of the CBIT reform, I focus on the
utility gain in stationary equilibrium. More precisely, I measure the welfare
gain or loss as the consumption compensation required for the household to
be indiﬀerent between the equilibrium before and after the tax change. With
inelastic labor supply, the change in welfare is equal to the percentage change
in steady-state consumption. 13
Table 3.7 reports the productivity and welfare changes following each tax
experiment. All aggregate variables are measured in percentage deviation
from the initial steady-state before the tax cuts.
Let start by the ﬁrst column of Table 3.7 which reports the eﬀects of elim-
inating both capital gains and dividend taxes with no changes to other tax
rates. Column 2 shows that the elimination of both taxes implies a better
allocation of capital and labor. More precisely, the increase in the corre-
lation between capital and productivity implies that there is a reallocation
of capital from low productivity to high productivity ﬁrms. The increase
in labor productivity is due to the increase in wage. This increase in wage
is in turn due to the increase in capital because the latter raises marginal
12. Further details on the computation are provided in Appendix C.2.
13. Details are provided in Appendix C.2
93
Table 3.7: Eﬃciency and Welfare Gains from Tax Cuts
τ g = 0 τ d = 0
Percentage Change τ d = 0 τ g = 0
(%) τ c = 0.34 τ c = 0.42
TFP 1.22 1.41
Y/L 3.27 -1.19
Correlation between ln k and ln z 18.78 20.39
Welfare 2.99 0.05
product of labor. As both inputs are more eﬃciently allocated, one should
expect an increase in aggregate productivity. Row 1 of Column 2 conﬁrms
this intuition. Two mechanisms explain these results. First, initially high
productivity ﬁrms with low capital issue new equity to ﬁnance investment
as the tax wedge disappears. Second, as dividend and capital gain become
perfect substitutes as sources of investment ﬁnancing, large and cash-rich
ﬁrms have less incentives to over-reinvest earnings. This latter eﬀect reduces
the lock-in eﬀect.
Column 3 of Table 3.7 reveals that the CBIT reform is followed by a decrease
in labor productivity. This is due to the decline in wage. Wage decreases be-
cause the aggregate capital decreases. As discussed in section 3.7.1, aggregate
capital decreases because the negative eﬀects of higher corporate proﬁt tax
on aggregate investment counterbalances the positive eﬀects of eliminating
capital gain and dividend taxes. However, Row 3 shows a better allocation
of capital. Two reasons may explain the improvement in capital allocation.
First, the elimination of the tax wedge between capital gain and dividend
improves capital allocation. Second, the eﬀect of higher corporate proﬁt tax
on ﬁrm-level investment depends on the ﬁnance regime of the ﬁrm. In fact,
by reducing the return on investment, higher corporate proﬁt tax discourages
investment from larger and cash-rich ﬁrms. These ﬁrms reduce investment
and labor demand, causing wage to decrease. The decline in wage increases
the current disposable cash ﬂows of equity-constrained ﬁrms. As these ﬁrms
have higher marginal productivity of capital and unused investment oppor-
tunities, they increase investment. Overall, the direct eﬀects of increased
corporate proﬁt tax reduce investment from larger and less productive ﬁrm.
However, lower wage indirectly increases investment of small and highly pro-
ductive ﬁrms because it increases disposable cash ﬂows. This reallocation of
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capital improves capital allocation. The CBIT tax reform implies higher pro-
ductivity gains, as reported in Column 2 and Column 3, because this second
eﬀect is absent in the previous experiment. Welfare increases less than in the
previous experiment because the aggregate output decreases. One should
expect welfare loss if the increase in corporate proﬁt tax does not improve
capital allocation.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the long run eﬀects of a Comprehensive Business Income
Tax (CBIT) reform proposed in 1992 by the U.S. Treasury’s Department.
More precisely, I assess the eﬀects of a corporate tax reform which eliminates
capital gain and dividend taxes and adjusts corporate proﬁt tax upward to
keep the reform revenue-neutral. Firm heterogeneity in productivity and
general equilibrium play a key role in the analysis. The ﬁrm heterogeneity
implies that ﬁrms may lie in diﬀerent ﬁnance regimes over time and respond
to tax changes in diﬀerent ways. First, I ﬁnd that the elimination of capi-
tal gain and dividend taxes reduces the distortion on ﬁrms’ investment and
ﬁnancial policy, and provides a boost to capital accumulation. Second, the
increase in the corporate proﬁt tax rate discourages capital accumulation be-
cause it reduces the after tax return on investment. The results show that
the latter eﬀect counterbalances the former, implying lower capital accumu-
lation, output and wage. However, the general equilibrium eﬀect reinforces
the positive reallocation eﬀects and the reform results in productivity and
welfare gains.
There are few ways in which the analysis could be improved. One would
ideally study the reform in an environment with corporate bonds to assess the
eﬀects of eliminating the tax diﬀerential between debt and equity ﬁnancing.
It would also be interesting to study the reform while considering the U.S.
as an opened-economy. Although the U.S. is the world’s largest economy, it
accounts for only about one quarter of the world’s capital stock. Hence, there
is potentially major scope for capital movement in response to fundamental
tax reforms.
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Appendices
A Appendix to Chapter 1
ii
A.1 Proofs
Ricardian equivalence result with Corporate Taxation
Let Z = {τt, Bt+1}+∞t=0 and Zˆ =
{
τˆt, Bˆt+1
}+∞
t=0
where:
+∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + ri)
−1τˆt =
+∞∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
(1 + ri)
−1τt, X denote the equilibrium value of
the variableX under Z, and Xˆ the value under Zˆ. If Ξ ≡ {Ct, Nt, Kt+1, θt+1},
then the equilibrium allocations under the policy Z is {Ξt, Bht+1, dt}+∞t=0 where
Bht+1 represents the household’s investment in government bonds. Given the
initial conditions, the proof proceeds in two steps. First, it shows that the
changes in the timing of the tax policy do not aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm,
i.e. V0 = Vˆ0. Second, it proves that
{
Ξt, Bˆ
h
t+1, dˆt
}+∞
t=0
is the competitive
equilibrium allocations under the policy Zˆ under the initial price system.
V0 = max
{Kt+1,Nt}+∞t=0
+∞∑
t=0
Λ0,t [F (Kt, Nt) + (1− δ)Kt − wtNt −Kt+1 − τt]
V0 = −
+∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tτt + max
{Kt+1,Nt}+∞t=0
H(Kt+1, Nt)
Vˆ0 = −
+∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tτˆt+ max
{Kt+1,Nt}+∞t=0
H(Kt+1, Nt) = −
+∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tτt+ max
{Kt+1,Nt}+∞t=0
H(Kt+1, Nt).
In addition, {Kt+1, Nt}+∞t=0 = argmaxH(Kt+1, Nt) = argmaxV0 = argmax Vˆ0.
Thus, {Kt+1, Nt}+∞t=0 is the equilibrium investment and employment alloca-
tions under Zˆ, i.e. {Kt+1, Nt}+∞t=0 =
{
Kˆt+1, Nˆt
}+∞
t=0
. Since the change in the
tax path does not aﬀect the household’s optimality conditions, proving that{
Ct, θt+1, B
h
t+1
}+∞
t=0
remains the equilibrium allocations under Zˆ amounts to
showing that these allocations are feasible under the household’s budget con-
straint and consistent with market clearing conditions.
From the good’s market clearing conditions: ∀t, Ct = F (Kt, Nt)+(1−δ)Kt−
Kt+1 − Gt = F (Kˆt, Nˆt) + (1 − δ)Kˆt − Kˆt+1 − Gt. {Ct}+∞t=0 is feasible. Next,
I choose ∀t, θt = 1 consistent with ﬁrm’s shares market clearing, and shows
that the implied household’s investment in government bonds is consistent
with the bond’s market clearing condition. The household budget constraint
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implies: Bˆht+1 − RtBˆht = dˆt + wtNt − Ct. Thus, these allocations are feasible
under Zˆ by construction. Next, I show that they are consistent with the
bond’s market clearing condition. Using the resource constraint of the ﬁrm:
dˆt = F (Kt, Nt) + (1 − δ)Kt − wtNt − Kt+1 − τˆt, implying Bˆht+1 − RtBˆht =
F (Kt, Nt) + (1 − δ)Kt − Kt+1 − τˆt − Ct. From the good’s market clearing
condition: F (Kt, Nt) + (1 − δ)Kt − Kt+1 − Ct = G. Thus, Bˆht+1 − RtBˆht =
G − τˆt = Bˆt+1 − RtBˆt. Starting from the initial condition Bˆh0 = Bˆ0 and
solving forward implies Bˆht+1 = Bˆt+1, ∀t. Next, I prove that this new debt
path satisﬁes the transversality condition.
BˆT+1 = RT BˆT +G− τˆT ⇒ lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
R−1t Bˆt+1 = lim
T→∞
−
T∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
R−1i (τˆt−Gt)+
B0 = lim
T→∞
−
T∑
t=0
t∏
i=0
R−1i (τt −Gt)− B0 ≡ 0.
Proof of lemma 1
Under lump sum tax, the consumption at steady-state is given by:
Css =
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
[
1− α+ α(1− β)
(1− β(1− δ))(1− κ1Dss<Dˆ)
]
− (τ¯ + Dˆ)κ1Dss<Dˆ
1− κ1Dss<Dˆ
−Gl
Css = 0 ⇒ G =
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
[
(1− α)(1− κ) + α(1− β)
(1− β(1− δ))
]
−Dˆκ ≡ Gˆl.
Proof of proposition 5
Under lump-sum tax:
Dss − Dˆ = 1
1− κ1Dss<Dˆ
[
(1− β)
β
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) 1
1−α
−Gl − Dˆκ1Dss<Dˆ
]
Dss − Dˆ = 1
1− κ1Dss<Dˆ
(
Dˆlhi − Dˆ −Gl
)
.
Dˆ < Dˆlhi ⇒ (Dss − Dˆ < −Gl < 0).
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Proof of Proposition 6
Under lump-sum tax:
Dss =
1
1− κ1Dss<Dˆ
[
α(1− β)
1− β(1− δ)
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
−Gl − Dˆκ1Dss<Dˆ
]
Dss < Dˆ ⇔ Gl > 1− β
β
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) 1
1−α
− Dˆ ≡ G¯l.
Proof of Proposition 7
Gˆl − G¯l =
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
[
(1− α)(1− κ) + α(1− β)
(1− β(1− δ))
]
−
Dˆκ− α(1− β)
1− β(1− δ)
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
+ Dˆ
Gˆl − G¯l > 0 ⇐⇒ Dˆ > −(1− α)
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
≡ Dˆllo.
Proof of Lemma 2
Under proportional tax, the steady state government debt is:
Bss =
β
1− β
[(
αβ(1− τ¯)
1− β + δβ(1− τ¯)
) α
1−α α(1− β)τ¯
1− β + δβ(1− τ¯) −G
]
Bss = 0 ⇔ G(τ) =
(
αβ(1− τ)
1− β + δβ(1− τ)
) α
1−α α(1− β)τ
1− β + δβ(1− τ)
[G(τ) = exp[lnG(τ)]] ⇐⇒
[
∂G(τ)
∂τ
=
∂ lnG(τ)
∂τ
exp[lnG(τ)]
]
⇐⇒
[
∂G(τ)
∂τ
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∂ lnG(τ)
∂τ
> 0
]
v[
∂ lnG
∂τ
=
(1− τ)(1− β + δβ − αδβ)− α(1− β)
τ(1− α)(1− τ)[1− β + δβ(1− τ)]
]
⇐⇒[
∂ lnG(τ)
∂τ
> 0 ⇔ τ < (1− β + δβ)(1− α)
1− β + δβ(1− α) ≡ τˆp
]
G(τˆp) = Gˆp =
⎡
⎣ αβ (1−β)α1−β+δβ(1−α)
1− β + δβ
(
(1−β)α
1−β+δβ(1−α)
)
⎤
⎦
α
1−α
⎡
⎣ α(1− β) (1−β+δβ)(1−α)1−β+δβ(1−α)
1− β + δβ
(
(1−β)α
1−β+δβ(1−α)
)
⎤
⎦
⇐⇒ Gˆp = α(1− α)
(
α2β
1− β + δβ
) α
1−α
{[
τˆp =
(1− β + δβ)(1− α)
1− β + δβ(1− α) > 0
]
and
[
1− τˆp = (1− β)α
1− β + δβ(1− α) > 0
]}
.
Proof of Proposition 8
The proof is established as follow:
1.
Dˆlol = (1− α)
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
1−α
< Dˆlop =
1− β
β
[
α2β
1− β + αδβ2 + δβ(1− β)
] 1
1−α
2. Dˆlop =
1− β
β
[
α2β
1− β + αδβ2 + δβ(1− β)
] 1
1−α
< Dˆhip =
1− β
β
(α
δ
) 1
1−α
3.
Dˆlop =
1− β
β
[
α2β
1− β + αδβ2 + δβ − δβ2
] 1
1−α
< Dˆhil =
1− β
β
[
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
] 1
1−α
4. Dˆhil =
1− β
β
[
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
] 1
1−α
< Dˆhip =
1− β
β
(α
δ
) 1
1−α .
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Proof of Proposition 9
Assume that Dˆ < Dˆhil . Proposition 8 implies that Dˆ < Dˆ
hi
p . Given this
result, I ﬁrst prove that:
Dss < Dˆ ⇐⇒ τ > αβ
α(1− β)1−α − Dˆ1−α(1− β + δβ)
αβα(1− β)1−α − δβDˆ1−α
≡ τ¯p
Thereafter, I derive the expression of the corresponding government spend-
ing:
G(τ¯p) = α
(
βDˆ
1− β
)α
+ δ
βDˆ
1− β − Dˆ ≡ G¯p.
Finally, I show that: Dˆ < Dˆhil =⇒ τ¯p > 0
Proof of lemma 3
Lemma 2 and proposition 9 have shown τˆp < 1 and τ¯p > 0, respectively.
Then, the proof consists in:
Dˆlop =
1− β
β
[
α2β
1− β + αδβ2 + δβ − δβ2
] 1
1−α
< Dˆ < Dˆhip =
1− β
β
(α
δ
) 1
1−α
⇐⇒ τ¯p < τˆp
First, I deﬁne τ¯p =
(1− α)(1 + δβ)
1 + δβ(1− α) . Afterwards, I show that:
τ¯p < τ¯p ⇐⇒ 1− β
β
(α
δ
) 1
1−α
> Dˆ >
1− β
β
[
α2β
1− β + αδβ2 + δβ(1− β)
] 1
1−α
.
Then, I prove τ¯p < τˆp.
A.2 Numerical Algorithm
The algorithm used to compute the transition dynamics of the economy when
tax is lump sum is as follows.
1. Solve for the steady state and ﬁx a length for the transition.
2. Make a guess on the status of the constraint for each period of the
transition.
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3. Given the initial stock of capital and the tax rate after tax cut, make
a guess for initial consumption.
4. Given the guess for consumption, use the household’s resource con-
straint to derive the dividend.
5. Given conjecture on the status of the constraint, use the ﬁrm’s re-
source constraint to derive the investment.
6. Given the capital choice of next period and the status of the constraint,
use in the ﬁrm’ Euler equation to determine the interest rate.
7. Given the interest rate, use the household’s Euler equation to have a
guess of the future consumption and tax rate.
8. Given the interest rate, the tax cuts and the zero debt government
condition for next period, use the government budget constraint to
update the conjecture of the future tax rate. This step is necessarily
only for the period after the tax cut. For the other periods, the tax
rate is the same as in steady state.
9. Repeat steps 3 to 8 until convergence of the investment decision to
its steady state value. If the investment decision does not converge
before the end of the transition, go back to step 3 and update the
guess on consumption.
10. After convergence, use the path of dividend and investment to check
the conjecture of the status of the constraint. If the conjecture is cor-
rect then stop. Otherwise, go back to step 3 and update the conjecture
on the status of the constraint.
B Appendix to Chapter 2
ix
B.1 Stationary Equilibrium
The algorithm used to solve for the stationary equilibrium consists of the
following steps.
1. Guess wages and solve for the decision rules incumbents and new
entrants.
2. Compute the stationary distribution by simulation.
3. Verify that the labor market clears.
Firm Optimization
1. Construct a grid for capital K ≡ {k1, k2, · · · , kNk}, with k1 suﬃciently
low and kNk suﬃciently large that changing them further has a neg-
ligible eﬀect on the solution. In practice Nk = 300. We use Nε = 5
states for the Markov chain.
2. For given wages, solve the dynamic program of the incumbent by value
iteration. We linearly interpolate the value function for investment
levels outside K. For each state (kp, εq) in the grid and for iteration j:
V j+1(kp, εq) = max
k′∈K
⎧⎨
⎩d(kp, εq, k′) + β
⎡
⎣ ηk
′ + (1− η)∗∑
ε′
π(ε′|εq)V j(k′, ε′)
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
where d(kp, εq, k′) is the dividend conditional on an optimal labor
choice, and it also incorporates the dividend constraint.
3. Iterate on the Bellman equation until the following convergence crite-
rion is satisﬁed:
max
kp,εq
∣∣∣∣V j+1(kp, εq)− V j(kp, εq)10−3 + |V j(kp, εq)|
∣∣∣∣ < 10−6.
4. The solution to the new entrant’s problem is simply ke = d¯. We verify
that the dividend constraint is in fact binding.
Market Equilibrium
1. Conjecture wages w.
x2. Select a simulation length S = 3 million + 1000. Choosing a larger
number produces no signiﬁcant changes to the stationary distribution
of capital. Initialize an incumbent ﬁrm with some arbitrary state
(k0, ε0).
3. Simulate a sequence of exit shocks of length S by drawing random
numbers from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability η.
4. If the ﬁrm is to continue producing next period, compute investment
using the incumbent’s decision rule k′(kp, εq), and draw next period’s
productivity shock from the conditional distribution π.
5. If ﬁrm is to exit next period, compute investment using the new en-
trant’s decision rule k′ = d¯, and draw next period’s productivity shock
from the long-run distribution π¯.
6. Discard the ﬁrst 1000 observations, and use the empirical distribution
of capital over the remaining simulation periods as an approximation
to the steady-state cross-sectional distribution of capital.
7. Check whether aggregate labor demand nd ≡
S∑
s=1001
ns/(S−1000) ≈ 1,
where ns is the ﬁrm’s optimal labor choice at time s.
B.2 Transitional Dynamics
Given the steady-state solution and the policy described in Section 2.6, we
solve for the transitional dynamics as follows.
1. Compute the steady-state described in the previous section, and ob-
tain the stationary values for consumption c, wages w, as well as the
incumbent’s value function V . Guess the approximative length of the
transition T . In practice T = 10 works well, and increasing it further
does signiﬁcantly change the transition path.
2. Guess paths for consumption {ct}Tt=1 and wages {wt}Tt=1, with cT = c
and wT = w.
3. Given the consumption path, derive the path for interest rate, {rt+1}Tt=1
where rt+1 = ct+1/(βct)− 1.
4. Given the path for wages and interest rates, solve the dynamic problem
of incumbents and new entrants by backward induction, with VT+1 =
V .
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5. Starting from each initial condition drawn from the steady-state dis-
tribution, simulate the problem of a ﬁrm for T periods, following the
procedure described in the “market equilibrium" step on the preceding
section.
6. From the implied sequence of cross-sectional distributions, compute
aggregate investment it, output yt and labor demand ndt at each period
along the transition. Derive the implied value of consumption cˆt that
would clear the ﬁnal good market, cˆt = yt − it − g.
7. Check whether cˆt ≈ ct and ndt ≈ 1 for each t ∈ {1, T − 1}
C Appendix to Chapter 3
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C.1 Numerical Algorithm
I ﬁrst solve the initial steady-state with the tax parameters in Table 3.1
and store the government revenue. Second, I solve for the steady-state with
zero capital gain and dividend taxes while maintaining the corporate proﬁt
tax rate unchanged. Third, to compute the eﬀect of the tax reform, I set the
dividend and capital gain tax rates to zero. Then, I consider a function which
takes as input the corporate proﬁt tax rate and gives as output the diﬀerence
between the implied total government revenue and the initial government
revenue. Thereafter, I solve for the corporate tax rate which equalize this
function to zero. The function incorporates a subroutine which solves a
stationary equilibrium for each value of corporate proﬁt tax rate considered.
Once I obtain the required corporate proﬁt tax rate, I solve the ﬁnal steady-
state. The algorithm used to solve the stationary equilibrium consists of the
following steps.
1. Guess wages and solve for the decision rules incumbents and new
entrants.
2. Compute the stationary distribution by simulation.
3. Verify that the labor market clears.
Further details on each step are provided in B.1
C.2 Computation of Eﬃciency and Welfare Gains
To quantify the productivity gains, I use the Total Factor Productivity as in
Gourio and Miao [2010].
TFP =
Y
KανN ν(1−α)
=
´
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] [´
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]
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where Eμ and Covμ denote the expectation and covariance operators for the
stationary distribution μ, respectively. The covariance term captures the
fact that capital may move among ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity shocks.
In this perspective, Gourio and Miao [2010] considers that it represents the
reallocation eﬀect. A higher value of this term means that high productivity
ﬁrms own more capital implying a better capital allocation.
To measure the eﬃciency of labor allocation, I refer to the labor productivity.
Y
L
=
´
ε (kαn1−α)νdμ(k, ε)´
ndμ(k, ε)
=
(
ν(1−α)
w
) ν(1−α)
1−ν(1−α) ´
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1
1−ν(1−α)dμ(k, ε)(
ν(1−α)
w
) 1
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1
1−ν(1−α)dμ(k, ε)
=
w
ν(1− α)
This equation shows that any change in the labor productivity is fully ex-
plained by a change. The change in wage in turn stems from a change in
capital because a change in the latter changes the marginal product of labor.
I measure the welfare gains or losses by the consumption compensation
needed to leave the household indiﬀerent between two paths of consump-
tion. In this paper, I focus on the welfare change in steady-state because I
am interested in the long run eﬀects of the tax reform. Let U¯ and Uˆ denote
the indirect stationary equilibrium life-time utility before and after tax cuts,
respectively.
U¯ =
+∞∑
t=0
βt [log(c¯)] =
log c¯
1− β
where c¯ is the consumption in the stationary equilibrium before the tax cut.
If Uˆ denotes the indirect steady-state life-time utility after the tax cut, the
welfare gains or losses  is such that:
Uˆ =
+∞∑
t=0
βt [log ((1 +)c¯)] = log ((1 +)c¯)
1− β =
log cˆ
1− β
Then:
log ((1 +)c¯) = log c¯ ⇒  = cˆ
c¯
− 1
